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Many philosophers and psychologists with a naturalistic bent draw on 
evolutionary biology to support theories about aspects of human psychology 
and behavior.  In this dissertation, I examine and develop some challenges to 
this approach. The dissertation is intended as an interdisciplinary contribution, 
examining methodological issues about the study of human behavior and 
drawing not only on philosophical resources, but also, crucially, on the work of 
biologists, evolution psychologists, sociobiologists and behavioral ecologists. 
Chapter 1 addresses Ruth Millikanʼs theory of proper functions.  Millikan uses 
a model derived from evolutionary biology to give an account of the purposive 
and quasi-normative features of biological characters.  I argue that although 
the theory of proper functions gives a useful analysis of the purposive and 
quasi-normative features of biological items, it places undue and unnecessary 
emphasis on selection at the expense of fitness.  I go on to show that 
Millikanʼs attempt to reduce intentional purposes to proper functions fails, and 
  
 
that it conflates ultimate explanations with proximate ones.  Chapter 2 
develops a novel line of argument against evolutionary psychology, showing 
that the discipline is riddled with methodological flaws which result from 
attempts to offer ultimate explanations of contemporary human psychology.  I 
argue that evolutionary psychologists are unable to show that the proximate 
psychology of contemporary humans is identical to the proximate psychology 
of prehistoric hominins, because they do not address the problem of 
individuating modules.  I argue that such identities may be impossible to 
establish, and that any version of evolutionary psychology is therefore likely 
doomed to failure.  Chapter 3 assesses Richard Joyceʼs evolutionary 
argument for moral skepticism.  I show that evolutionary arguments of the sort 
that he offers suffer from various scientific and philosophical difficulties, 
including variations on the problems identified in Chapter Two.  Joyceʼs 
argument consists of two components: an empirical argument about the 
evolutionary origin of moral concepts and an epistemic argument purporting to 
draw a metaethical conclusion from the evolutionary story.  I show that both 
the empirical and epistemic components of Joyceʼs argument are seriously 
flawed, and that it cannot help one decide between moral realism and moral 
anti-realism, as Joyce claims.
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CHAPTER 1 
  On the Limits of Evolutionary Theory: Millikan on Purpose1 
 
1.  Introduction: philosophyʼs evolutionary turn 
Incorporating evolutionary theory into oneʼs philosophical enterprise is now in vogue.  
This is not only the case among philosophers of biology who must at times address 
questions pertaining to evolutionary biology, but also among philosophers whose work 
addresses questions outside of biology, narrowly conceived.  For many of the latter, the 
use of evolutionary theory is not a mere ornament (an attractive but dispensable 
component of their work) but rather is considered as a fundamental theoretical tool (e.g., 
Gibbard 1990, Skyrms 1996, Dretske 1997; Kornblith 2005, Street 2006, Joyce 2006, 
Neander 2012).  
It is easy to understand the motivation for philosophyʼs evolutionary turn.  We human 
beings are animals that were shaped by evolution, and this suggests that facts about 
the kind of biological organism that we are might be useful in addressing questions 
about our properties and capacities – including questions about traditional philosophical 
topics such as reference, knowledge, mental content, and how it is that we are able to 
live purposeful lives.  Evolutionary biology is an enterprise that has fundamentally 
                                            
1 In this chapter, I use the word “purpose” in several ways.  In biological contexts, or 
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altered the way that humans conceive of their position in the natural world.  Might it not 
also have the power to reconfigure how we think about ourselves philosophically?  The 
biological facts must, it seems, have some bearing on how we explain some things 
about human beings, but exactly what explanatory role or roles these facts should play 
in philosophical theorizing remains obscure.   
In the present chapter, I will engage with this problem by investigating Ruth Millikanʼs 
use of evolutionary biology.  I wish to determine how she uses evolutionary theory 
philosophically, as well as what she gets right and what she gets wrong when she 
applies it.  Her work promises to make for an informative case study, because it is 
perhaps the most thoroughgoing, scientifically informed, and ambitious attempt to 
harness evolutionary theory for philosophical purposes.   
I will focus on the most central component of her system: her theory of proper functions.  
The chapter consists of two parts (in addition to this introduction, the conclusion, and a 
list of references).  In the first part (Sections Two and Three) I set out and motivate the 
theory of proper functions, using the problem of content as a point of entry.  I begin with 
a discussion of the problem of explaining mental content, with an emphasis on the 
importance of accounting for misrepresentation, and segue into Millikanʼs claim that one 
needs an empirically respectable analysis of the normative dimension of biological 
functions to explain misrepresentation.  I then delve into her analysis of natural 
purposes and explicate three distinct kinds of biological explanations.  In the second 
part of the chapter (Sections Four through Nine) I assess Millikanʼs project, with a focus 
on whether the explanations entailed by her theory are reductive.  In this part of the 
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chapter, I focus entirely on the biological adequacy of her theoretical apparatus, on the 
grounds that any appropriation of evolutionary theory for philosophical purposes will fail 
unless it gets the science right.  I begin with a discussion of what it is for an explanation 
to be biologically reductive, and identify three arenas in which reduction can occur 
(corresponding to the three kinds of biological explanations described earlier).  Next, I 
argue that the selectionist component of the theory of proper functions leads to 
conclusions that are not only deeply unintuitive, but are also reductive, and inconsistent 
with the correct role of natural selection in biological explanations.  I then go on to query 
whether a Millikan-style theory is reductive in other respects by testing the approach 
(shorn of its selectionist overlay) against challenges posed by biological learning, novel 
adaptive behavior, and developmental plasticity.  I argue that the theory of proper 
functions is compatible with our best scientific understanding of these phenomena.  
Last, I evaluate Millikanʼs claim that intentional purposes are reducible to biological 
proper functions.  I show that the claim is undermotivated, and that it is inconsistent with 
her theory of proper functions.  Examining this overextension of biological explanation 
throws light on the limits of evolutionary explanation.    
2.  Motivating Millikanʼs project      
To understand Millikanʼs evolutionary turn one must get to grips with her broad 
philosophical platform.  In asking philosophical questions about human beings and their 
capacities, she never loses sight of the fact that human beings are animals.  At a bare 
minimum, the fact that we are animals places constraints on how we can go about 
answering certain philosophical questions.  Philosophical explanations need to be 
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consistent with the best current accounts of biological systems (an elegant theory of, 
say, mental representation that is inconsistent with the way that the mammalian nervous 
system works is, in effect, no theory at all).  But Millikan thinks that the philosophical 
importance of biology is much more profound and far-reaching than merely providing a 
constraint on theorizing.  She holds that some philosophical questions are not 
answerable unless we draw on biology to answer them.  She does not begin by asking 
what the relevance of evolution is to some philosophical question.  Rather, she starts 
with some feature of organisms or their relation to the world that is difficult to make 
sense of.  She then asks what must be the case in order for the phenomenon to obtain 
and, after considering the projectable alternatives, is ultimately led to the conclusion that 
evolutionary theory (applied either literally or, as we will see, metaphorically) is needed 
to explain it.   
It is helpful to set out Millikanʼs theoretical apparatus in the context of how she 
addresses a particular philosophical problem.  Consider the problem of explaining 
mental content.  To explain mental content, one needs to identify the sort of relation that 
obtains between electrochemical states in the brain and states of affairs, such that the 
former have the latter as their content.  The nature of this relation is puzzling, because it 
seems to be different in kind from all of the other relations that are recognized by 
science (causal relations, spatial relations, temporal relations, and so on).  Millikan 
addresses this difficulty by identifying biological items which, although non-mental, 
nonetheless have content.  She then develops an analysis that accounts for their having 
content, and applies this analysis to address the problem of mental content.   
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Millikan argues that it is reasonable to think of intentionality as a property that is shared 
by many biological systems, rather than something that is restricted to the realm of the 
mental.  Her approach is guided by the broadly Darwinian assumption that all features 
of organisms are products of evolution, that the differences between organisms are the 
cumulative result of very many small genetic changes over vast expanses of time, and 
that comparative methods can sometimes help us understand characteristics that 
members of different clades have in common.  If a characteristic is widespread among 
organisms belonging to different clades, then this strongly suggests (but does not entail) 
that they share the characteristic because of their common descent.  Biologists use the 
term homology for similarities across clades that are explained by common descent 
(see paper two of this dissertation).  Understanding this, and understanding the 
ecological pressures that gave rise to the characteristics, can allow one to make 
inferences about its genealogy and nature. 
One of Millikanʼs methodological innovations is to use cladistic analysis philosophically.  
Take some puzzling feature of human beings – for example, our capacity to token 
contentful states.  Next, identify what appears to be a non-human homolog of that 
feature.  Then use the homologous trait to make inferences about the human trait.  She 
uses this method to explain mental content by focusing on the signaling behavior of 
organisms that cannot reasonably be thought of as having propositional attitudes.  Her 
(1984) paradigm case is the waggle dance performed by honeybees (Apis mellifera).  
When a honeybee returns to her hive from a successful foraging expedition, she 
performs a series of stereotyped movements.  These movements systematically co-vary 
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with the distance and direction of the nectar source, as well as the quantity of nectar to 
be found there.  The dance guides other bees to the source of nectar by providing them 
with information about its location.  This information is encoded in a figure-eight pattern 
on the vertical comb.  The pattern consists of “waggle runs,” during which she rapidly 
shakes her body, alternating with return phases in which she loops back to her starting 
point.  The dance encodes information in several ways.  The orientation of the run gives 
information about the direction of the food source relative to the position of the sun.  The 
duration of the run gives information about the duration of the flight to the food source, 
and the duration of the whole dance gives information about the quality of the food 
source.2   The level of detail that is included in the discussion above should not be taken 
as extraneous to the goals of the chapter as a whole.  Rather, its aim is to steer the 
reader into Millikanʼs framework. 
It looks like honeybee dances are about nectar.  But it is not reasonable to think that 
these insectsʼ nervous system can support propositional attitudes.  This, in conjunction 
with the thought that honeybee signals (or the neural mechanism that produces them) 
are homologs of mental contents, suggests that whatever it is that accounts for 
honeybee dances having content might also account for mental states having content.   
                                            
2 Gould (1975) shows that the systematic, combinatorial properties of honeybee dances 
are such that they can generate at least forty million distinct signals, and Crist (2004) 
argues that the waggle dance ought to be regarded as a genuine language, but see 
Anderson (2004) for objections. 
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It is intuitive that honeybee dances have the purpose of communicating information 
about nectar sources to hive-mates.  It is this that makes it possible for dances to 
succeed in achieving their purpose or fail in doing so.  That honeybee dances and other 
non-human signals have purposes in this sense, and therefore are apt for success or 
failure, suggests that normativity or something like it is a general characteristic of 
biological systems rather than something that is restricted to humans.  If this broad view 
of normativity is right, it rules out accounts of normativity that are solely concerned with 
humans.  Consider the problem of explaining how humans misrepresent.  According to 
one view, misrepresentations have content, but their content consists of merely 
intentional states of affairs.3  But appealing to intentional objects as an explanation of 
misrepresentation simpliciter is inadequate.  It is inadequate because it cannot be 
applied to every species that misrepresents.  Suppose that a honeybee executes her 
dance incorrectly and thereby misrepresents the location of nectar.  If bees do not have 
mental representations,4 then an incorrectly executed dance cannot represent a merely 
intentional nectar source.   
Millikan argues that making sense of honeybee dances and a whole range of other 
biological phenomena requires an analysis of their normative dimension.  Such an 
                                            
3 This view is often incorrectly attributed to Brentano.  See Crane (2006). 
4 In what follows, I will refer to any contentful items as “representations.” Millikan initially 
limited “representation” to cover states of organisms that are about the world and which 
participate in inferences and re-identifications, and distinguished them from simpler 
“intentional icons.”  In her later writings, she adopted the convention of referring to both 
of these as “representations”. 
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analysis needs to clarify what it is about them that accounts for their being the sorts of 
things that can succeed or fail.  She addresses this by means of her theory of proper 
functions. 
3.  Proper functions 
Unlike the objects investigated in physics and chemistry, biological items seem to have 
purposes (in a sense that I shall shortly make clear).  Honeybee dances do not just 
signal the location of nectar; they are for signaling the location of nectar.  Hearts do not 
just pump blood; they are for pumping blood.  And eyes do not merely see; they are for 
seeing.  Such attributions of purpose come very naturally.  But what should one make of 
them?  Are these items really purposive, and are there purposes in nature more 
generally?  If there are, how can one account for them in a manner that is consistent 
with the scientific world-view? 
Saying of something that it has a purpose is ambiguous.  On one reading, having a 
purpose is the same as having an intention.  For example, one has the purpose of going 
outside if oneʼs behavior is guided by the intention to go outside.  Clearly, this notion of 
having a purpose can only be applied to whole organisms that possess the sort of 
cognitive architecture that makes it possible for them to have intentions.  It would be 
laughable to say that bee dances have purposes in this sense.  
The purposes that one attributes to honeybee dances and bodily organs resemble the 
purposes attributed to artifacts more closely than they do the purposes attributed to 
agents.  When one says of a clock that it has the purpose of telling time, one does not 
mean to say that the clock intends to tell time.  Rather, one means that it is designed to 
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tell time.  This is why it makes sense to evaluate the performance of clocks (qua clocks) 
on the basis of their performance as time-keepers.  But there is an important sense in 
which the purposes of artifacts like clocks are dissimilar to the purposes of biological 
items.  The purposes of artifacts are derived from their designersʼ intentions.  But 
biological items are not intentionally designed.  They come about through the 
purposeless process of evolution.  Suppose, then, that one treats evolution as a grand 
designer, and says of biological items that what they are for is what evolution designed 
them to do?  Suppose that honeybee dances are for signaling the location of nectar 
because Mother Nature “designed” them for this purpose.  The metaphor of nature as 
an engineer is evocative, and has gained wide currency (e.g. Dennett 1995) but it is not 
informative unless the “designer” metaphor can be cashed out empirically.  
Millikanʼs key biological notion — the foundation of her whole philosophical apparatus — 
is her theory of proper functions.  To have a proper function, an item must belong to 
what she calls a reproductively established family.  These are populations that are 
united by common descent.  Clades are reproductively established families, and so are 
anatomical categories like “mammalian heart” and behavioral categories like “honeybee 
dance.”  First-order reproductively established families are created by the reproduction 
of a prototype, and reproduction of reproductions of the prototype.  A population 
consisting of tokens of an allele is a first-order reproductively established family if every 
one of those alleles is either a copy of the original allele or a copy of a copy of it.  
Higher-order reproductively established families are populations of items that are 
produced by first-order reproductively established families.  So, my left foot is a member 
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of a higher order reproductively established family.  It is not a copy of my motherʼs left 
foot or my fatherʼs left foot, but it was built by genes that were copied from my parentsʼ 
genes.  Left feet do not have ancestors in the ordinary sense of the word. However, they 
have something like ancestors in an indirect, derivative sense – a sense in which my 
grandmotherʼs left foot was an ancestor of my left foot.  In this chapter I will use the 
terms “ancestor” and “ancestral” as Millikan does to cover straightforward first-order 
cases like genes as well as higher-order cases like left feet.  It is important to note that 
this departs from the orthodox use of these terms.   
There are two kinds of proper functions: direct ones and derived ones.  The direct 
proper function of a trait is that for which it was selected for doing in previous 
generations.  These traits were selected for because their effects accounted for their 
own reproduction in an ancestral population.  Some items with direct proper functions 
were selected for performing their functions by means of producing other items.  Items 
that are so produced derive their proper functions from the items that were selected for 
producing them.  Consider the human pancreas.  One of the direct proper functions of 
the pancreas is to regulate levels of blood sugar.  It realizes its proper function by 
producing the hormones glucagon and insulin, which modulate levels of blood sugar 
(glucagon raises it and insulin lowers it).  Pancreatic hormones derive their proper 
function of regulating blood sugar from the proper function of the pancreas because, in 
producing them, the pancreas performs its proper functions.  It is important to note that 
selection plays an essential role with respect to both kinds of proper function.  By 
Millikanʼs lights, all proper functions have to be selected for. 
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4.  Considering an alternative 
Here is where things stand.  Millikanʼs treatment of the problem of content places 
biology at the center of her solution.  I think that her strategy has some obvious benefits, 
but it also has some apparent disadvantages.  There is a view amongst some 
philosophers of science that scientific explanations must be causal explanations (e.g., 
Salmon 1984, Lewis 1986).  On this view, biological norms can play no role in scientific 
explanation because they are causally inert.  But even if one countenances the 
scientifically legitimacy of some non-causal properties, framing ones explanations in 
terms of straightforwardly causal properties may be preferable on methodological 
grounds.  Consequently, it is important to consider whether there is any alternative to 
Millikanʼs explanations of natural purposes that does not rely on non-causal properties.  
Broadly speaking, there are two such alternatives.  One way to proceed is to reduce 
biological norms to ordinary causal phenomena.  The other is to eliminate them entirely.   
Both reductionists and eliminativists draw on a causal-role account of biological 
functions.  This account, as developed by Cummins (1975), analyzes the functions of 
biological items as their causal contribution to capacities of larger biological systems of 
which they are parts (hence, it is often referred to as the theory of systemic functions).  
A number of philosophers5 endorse both the theory of systemic functions and the theory 
of proper functions, because they regard them as having distinct and mutually 
                                            
5 I do not wish to imply that Millikanʼs and Cumminsʼ theories are the only accounts of 
function currently on the table.  See, for example, Neander (1991a, 1991b), Papineau 
(eliminativists 1984), Dretske (1986), Schroeder (2004), and Mossio et. al.(2009). 
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compatible explanatory roles.  But reductionists hold that systemic functions can do all 
the work that proper functions do, including accounting for biological normativity, and 
they argue that this approach is preferable on grounds of parsimony.  Eliminativists 
accept that the systemic theory cannot account for biological norms, but argue that this 
is not a problem for it because biological norms are illusory.   
I begin with eliminativism.  Pargetter and Bigelow (1987) express the eliminativist worry 
as follows, “It is assumed that functions, if there were any, would have to be important, 
currently existing, causally active and explanatory properties of a character or 
structure….It is thus concluded that there really are no functions in nature” (182-183). 
To add functions to the scientific biological picture, on this view, is parallel to 
adding final causes to physics.  Final causes have no place in the scientific 
account of the physical universe, and, if the psychological pressures are resisted, 
we find we can do without them and final causes just fade away.  To the 
eliminativist, the same will be true of functions; as the biological sciences 
develop, any need for function talk will vanish, and the psychological naturalness 
of such talk will fade away with time and practice (183). 
This project can only succeed if, as Davies (2003) argues, biological science can 
dispense with the notion of proper functions at no explanatory cost, because there are 
no facts about organisms that would be inexplicable without it.  For this project to go 
through, it must be the case that objectively speaking biological items cannot succeed 
or fail (in the normative sense).  Of course, one might say that they succeed or fail to do 
what one expects them to do or want them to do, but these would be subjective rather 
 13 
than objective normative criteria.  Imposing normative standards on natural phenomena 
is a different matter from finding them there.  There are no norms in nature. 
Contrary to the claim that norms do no explanatory work in biology, it is clear that 
eliminating them would impoverish biological discourse, because unlike explanations in 
physics and chemistry, explanations in biology make essential use of notions such as 
damage, malfunction, illness, and deformity – notions that are intelligible only with 
reference to standards of performance.  These notions are not extraneous to the 
inferential practices that are characteristic of biology.  They are biologically explanatory, 
and their being so presupposes realism about such norms, without this entailing any 
particular view of what they consist in. 
For eliminativists, getting rid of biological normativity entails getting rid of notions like 
malfunction.  For Boorse (2002),  
If Carlaʼs heart cannot pump blood, then pumping blood is not, in fact, the 
function of her heart; it has no function.  Since pumping blood is the [statistically] 
normal function of a human heart, it would be the function of Carlaʼs heart if 
Carlaʼs heart functioned normally; but it does not, so it is not (89). 
It is standard practice among medical professionals to make claims of the form “Some 
feature of x is not functioning as it should.”  They make such claims because they have 
already bought into the idea that there are normal and abnormal ways for the item under 
consideration to behave.  It is precisely because pumping blood is its function that one 
holds that it is a problem that Claraʼs heart has stopped pumping blood.  Judgments of 
this kind motivate the development and implementation of procedures for restoring 
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normal function. With notions like “malfunction” off the table, it is not clear how medical 
scientists could carry out their work.  The eliminativist stance is extreme, and, if 
adopted, would cause more problems than it would solve.  Reductionism might be a 
more promising strategy.  
Godfrey-Smith (1993) argues that malfunctions can be understood in purely causal 
terms.  They can be analyzed as departures from what is typical of their kind.  If a 
biological token is not able to fill the causal role that tokens of their kind usually fill in 
broader systems of which they are parts, then the token malfunctions.  If this analysis is 
sustainable, then the theory of systemic functions provides a live alternative to the 
theory of proper functions.  There are several problems that any version of the typicality 
theory must surmount.  Any such theory must have the resources to explain how it is 
that there are biological items that typically do not perform their functions.  It is 
uncontroversial that sperm cells are for fertilizing ova, even though fertilizing ova is far 
from typical of sperm cells. 6  This shows that typicality is not necessary for biological 
norms.  Additionally, the criterion does not distinguish functions from their side-effects. 
Making thumping sounds is typical of hearts, but failing to make a thumping sound is not 
a malfunction (it is an effect of a malfunction).  A third worry is that the typicality analysis 
does not distinguish failure from abnormal success.  Any performance might deviate 
from the (statistical) norm either because it underperforms or because it performs 
exceptionally well (see Amundson 2000).  Both better-than-average vision and worse-
                                            
6 The example is from Millikan (1984). 
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than-average vision are deviations from the statistical norm.  By the typicality criterion, 
both must be characterized as malfunctions.  A fourth difficulty concerns the problem of 
individuating populations.  Traits count as typical or atypical only with respect to 
populations.  So statements about typicality are only contentful if they are statements 
about typicality-in-a-population.  This raises an important question about how to 
individuate populations.  Should the reference populations for typicality judgments be 
whole species, organisms in certain ecologies, organisms at a certain stage of their life 
cycle, or some other division?  An item might typically behave one way in population A 
and another way in population B, even though B is a subset of A.  In that case, there are 
two different, and possibly inconsistent, norms of functioning for a single item.  For 
example, the rate of myopia worldwide is around thirty percent, but in Singapore it is as 
high as eighty percent (Seet et al. 2001).  So, myopia is not typical of people generally 
(at least, at the present time), but it is typical of the residents of Singapore.  So, by the 
typicality criterion, myopia is a disorder when considered in relation to the world 
population as a whole and not a disorder when considered in relation to the population 
of Singapore.  Consequently one cannot say, without qualification, of any nearsighted 
Singaporean that her eyes malfunction.  
In conclusion, eliminativism about biological norms does not seem plausible, and the 
strategy of reducing norms to typicality is faced with serious obstacles.  As these appear 
to be the two most plausible alternatives, a strategy like Millikanʼs, which grants that 
purposiveness is an irreducible feature of certain biological phenomena, is prima facie 
vindicated.  It is important to note, though, that this conclusion endorses the general 
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form of her solution, not the details of her analysis (about which I will raise objections) or 
her manner of applying it. 
5.  Three kinds of biological explanation 
To properly assess the role of biology in Millikanʼs system, and to evaluate the extent to 
which her philosophical strategy succeeds, it is necessary to examine her notion of 
biological explanation more closely.   
The theory of proper functions abstracts away from key elements of the theory of 
evolution.  In abstracting away from the biological details, Millikan insists that her theory 
goes further than biology in the literal sense does.  The process of evolution is, she 
believes, just one instantiation of the broader proper function formula, which is also 
realized in other domains, such as psychology and culture.7   
Somewhat confusingly, Millikan tends to characterize anything that satisfies the proper 
function formula as “biological.”  Her indiscriminate use of the term sometimes makes it 
difficult to know exactly what claim she means to be making.  Consider her (1984, 2005) 
claim that language is “biological”.  There is a trivial sense in which language is 
biological.  As far as is known, Homo sapiens are the only language users.  They are 
animals, and animals are biological entities, so (platitudinously) language is a biological 
phenomenon – but then so is every feature of every organism.  But Millikan does not 
have this vacuous notion in mind when she describes things as “biological,” nor does 
                                            
7 The idea the evolution can be abstractly characterized comes from Lewontin (1970). 
See Buskes (2013) for a useful survey and evaluation of views on evolution as a 
multiply realizable, “substrate-neutral” process. 
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she mean to say that all “biological” items are literally biological either.  For example, 
she writes in Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories that she “used 
ʻbiological categoriesʼ by extension to cover all proper function categories” (1984: 29).  
And in her 1993 essay “Propensities, exaptations, and the brain,” she informs readers 
that the point of the definition of proper function was to “capture a certain similarity that I 
took to be important among items falling in [real] biological categories, language 
categories, purposive action categories, artifact categories, and certain kinds of cultural 
categories” (1993b: 31).  So, “biological categories” in a narrow sense – categories like 
“heart” or “mitochondrion” – are said to fall under “biological categories” in the broad 
sense only insofar as they possess proper functions.  She then adds:  
It was probably unwise to use the term ʻbiological categoryʼ as an informal 
substitute for ʻproper function categoryʼ...for this has given the false impression 
that my aim was to capture biologistsʼ usage.  On the contrary, I do not consider 
biological examples of proper functions to be more central than any others 
(1993b: 31).8   
Sifting through the various examples scattered through her writings, it becomes clear 
that Millikan offers three distinct sorts of biological explanations.  All of them cite 
evolution, or evolution-like processes, but they do so in different ways.  Some 
explanations are what I call strictly biological.  These are paradigmatically biological 
                                            
8 Elsewhere, she states explicitly that the term “biological” as used in the title of 
Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories “is used not literally, but broadly or 
metaphorically” (2002: 115). 
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explanations of paradigmatically biological phenomena.  She also occasionally offers 
what I call extended biological explanations – paradigmatically biological explanations of 
ostensibly non-biological phenomena (a kind of explanation that is commonplace in the 
literatures of evolutionary psychology and human sociobiology, as well as the work of 
philosophers who are influenced by these disciplines [e.g., Street 2006, Joyce 2006]). 
Both strict and extended forms are literally biological, but Millikan also gives what I call 
metaphorically biological explanations, which attribute proper functions to items that do 
not fall within the scope of literally biological explanations.  Consider her (2006) account 
of operant conditioning.  When a rat is rewarded by a food pellet whenever it pushes the 
bar in a Skinner box, it learns to push the bar repeatedly.  It is natural to say that once 
the bar-pushing becomes established in response to the reward that it produces, the 
bar-pushing acquires the purpose of getting food.  However, in saying this one does not 
have to assume that the rat intends to get food by pushing the bar.  An explanation of 
the ratʼs behavior that is cast in terms of proper functions enables one to attribute a 
purpose to the behavior without defaulting to an intentionalistic explanation of it: the 
behavior has a purpose even though it is not the ratʼs purpose to perform the behavior.  
The ratʼs behavior is said to satisfy the proper function formula because (a) the rat 
pressed the bar as well as performing other behaviors, (b) the first bar-pressing was 
reproduced because of its effect, and (c) bar pressings reproduced more successfully 
than non-bar-pressings.  Like all metaphorically biological explanations in Millikanʼs 
work, the proper function of the ratʼs behavior is cast in an evolutionary biological form 
but it does not have evolutionary biological content.  
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Given the role of selection in the proper function formula, each of these kinds of 
explanation requires that the item being explained was selected for, either literally or 
metaphorically. When Millikan offers strict and extended biological explanations, she 
assumes that the item being explained was subject to natural selection.  When she 
offers metaphorically biological explanations, she has it that the item being explained 
was subject to a process that bears an abstract resemblance to natural selection – 
some form of selection that is realized in a psychological or cultural medium.9  
6.  Reduction and the role of selection 
One question that can be asked of any biological explanation is whether it is reductive.  
Accordingly, I wish to explore the question of whether and in what respects Millikanʼs 
biological explanations are reductive.  There are many kinds of biologically reductive 
explanations (Brigant & Love 2007).  In this chapter, I will consider an explanation to be 
reductive if it purports to explain some phenomenon exhaustively or near-exhaustively 
in a more restrictive and simplifying manner than other well-confirmed explanations do.  
It follows that explanations are never reductive all on their own; they are only reductive 
in relation to other explanations.  Explanations that are reductive in this sense are 
                                            
9 The idea that there is such a thing as cultural evolution – roughly, that a broadly 
Darwinian model can explain phenomena in the cultural domain – is not unique to 
Millikanʼs work. The idea that an evolution-like process of variation and selection can 
explain certain kinds of cultural, scientific, and technological change has been advanced 
by a number of thinkers, including Popper (1972), Toulmin (1972), Campbell (1974a, 
1974b) Wilson 1975, Dawkins (1976), Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981), Boyd & 
Richerson (1985), Hull (1988) and Dennett (1995).  See Buskes (2013) for a review and 
evaluation of this theoretical tradition. 
 20 
scientifically dubious, because they fail to address the evidential and inferential 
considerations that motivate projectable rival accounts. 
All three kinds of biological explanations that I discussed above can be applied 
reductively.  I will consider each in turn.  Strictly biological explanations are reductive if 
the reducing explanation and the reduced explanation are both paradigmatically 
biological explanations.  Extended biological explanations are by their very nature 
reductive, because they are literally biological explanations of ostensibly non-biological 
phenomena.  Metaphorically biological explanations are reductive if they purport to 
account for non-biological phenomena more fully than rival non-biological explanations 
do.  It is an open question whether, in any given case, a reductive explanation 
succeeds. The warrant for a reductive explanation can be determined only by 
comparing the explanatory power of the reduced explanation with that of the reducing 
one.   
I wish to argue that the theory of proper functions is reductive in virtue of placing undue 
emphasis on selection, and that this seriously compromises the theoryʼs credibility.  I 
will also argue that the theory of proper functions would be improved by removing its 
selectionist element.  However, given Millikanʼs insistence on the indispensability of 
selection, incorporating such a modification would amount to proposing an alternative 
theory of proper functions. 
Recall that Millikan claims that anything with a proper function must have been selected 
for performing that function. For example, she asserts that “Only if an item or trait has 
been selected for reproduction, as over against other traits, because it sometimes has a 
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certain effect, does that effect count as a [proper] function” (1993b: 35, emphasis in 
original).  However, she sometimes does not mention selection at all when describing 
proper functions.  Consider her claim that the proper function of a characteristic is “a 
function that its ancestors performed that has helped account for the proliferation of the 
genes responsible for it, hence helped account for its own existence” (1993c: 14).  In 
this description it is fitness rather than selection that is doing the explanatory work.  
What looks like an oscillation between two alternative formulations is probably more 
apparent than real.  I think that it is best explained by the fact that anything that is 
selected for must promote fitness, because selection is just differential fitness at the 
level of populations.  I suspect that Millikan so takes for granted the intimate tie between 
fitness and selection that there is an unarticulated assumption that whenever fitness is 
maximized selection comes along for the ride.  But that this is by no means necessarily 
the case is made evident by the following example.   Suppose that there is a species of 
drosophila living in an environment that periodically gets very cold.  Some individuals in 
the population have thick skin, which protects them from the cold, while others have thin 
skin, which offers no such protection.  Suppose also that the individuals with thin skin 
are just as fertile as those with thick skin when exposed to normal temperatures, but 
become dormant and cannot reproduce when subjected to very low temperatures.  
Under these conditions, thick skin is selected for.  That is, thick-skinned flies produce 
more descendants than their thin-skinned sistren, and their numbers increase more 
rapidly than do the numbers of the thin-skinned flies.  After a number of generations, 
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there are no thin-skinned flies left.  The allele responsible for thick skin has reached 
fixation. 
If this were the end of the story, it would be a straightforward Millikanian case.  One 
would say that because the thermal effect of thick skin caused it to be reproduced more 
effectively than thin skin, and because thick skin was selected for its thermal effect, that 
thick skin had the proper function of protecting the flies from cold. 
Now, suppose that the following occurred.  At some point after the gene causing thick 
skin reached fixation, there was a change in the climate.  Very low temperatures no 
longer occurred, and the warmer conditions caused deadly parasites to proliferate – 
parasites that preyed on insects.  The parasites normally enter their hostsʼ bodies by 
boring through their skin, and once inside, they multiply and kill their host.  However, 
thanks to the fliesʼ thick skin the parasites were unable to infect them.10  Under these 
altered environmental circumstances, thick skin provided an important fitness benefit, 
and this benefit undoubtedly explained its continued reproduction, but this was not the 
fitness benefit for which the trait was selected.  According to Millikanʼs theory, the proper 
function of thick skin remained that of protecting flies from the cold, because that is what 
it was selected for doing.  But this diagnosis seems wrong.  It is more intuitive that its 
proper function changed to protection from parasites, even though there was no 
                                            
10 This example is a hybrid of a case described by Dover (2000) and a case described 
by Sober (1984). 
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selection for protection from parasites.11  It is clear that if they had not had thick skin the 
flies would not have been able to reproduce at all, since the parasites would have driven 
them to extinction.  In fact, in these circumstances, thick skin offered greater fitness 
benefits than it did in the circumstances where it was selected for.  In the first situation, 
thin-skinned flies could reproduce, but could not reproduce as effectively as thick-
skinned flies.  But in the second situation, thin-skinned flies would not have been able to 
reproduce at all. 
Millikan does not offer any justification for the selection requirement.  The core of the 
proper function formula – the idea that the purpose of a trait can be explained by its 
contribution to its own reproduction – is all about fitness.  And the selection clause does 
not to add anything useful to the analysis.  To see why, one need only consider what 
natural selection is.  Natural selection is a way of describing effects of phenotypic traits 
at the population level.  Saying that a trait has been selected for performing some 
function is equivalent saying that the trait is more fully represented in the population 
than some alternative trait on account of the aggregate effects of the two traits on 
individual fitnesses.  But the representation of a trait in a population does not tell us 
anything about individual organisms.  Okrent (2007) puts the point admirably well. 
Population thinking accounts for the prevalence of some structure or behavior in 
some population, not for the presence of some structure or behavior in some 
individual, as Millikan thinks.  One accounts for the fact that a certain percentage 
                                            
11 For related discussions see also Buller (1998), Abrams (2006), and Preston (2009). 
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of humans have a heart of a certain type by appealing to the facts that some 
ancestor population had a range of different hearts and that, in the environment 
in which those ancestors functioned, those with the kind of heart that most of us 
now possess were more fit than the others….But what is explained is always that 
some percentage of some population, perhaps approaching 100 percent, has 
such and such features (95). 
Selection cannot enter into an explanation of phenomena at the level of individuals.  It 
cannot explain, and should not be used to explain, why it is that a particular trait has a 
certain proper function in the lives of organisms that possess the trait.  By analogy, 
knowing that in a population of coin tosses heads come up roughly fifty percent of the 
time does not explain why any particular toss comes up heads.  Millikanʼs selectionist 
account of proper functions is reductive, because it misconstrues the explanatory role of 
natural selection by conflating population-level explanations with explanations at the 
level of individuals (individual organisms, structures, behaviors, or genes).  Millikan 
neglects to show that fitness cannot do the job that she tries to recruit selection to do.  
Orthodox Millikanian explanations are reductive even in cases where the proper function 
of a trait is what the trait has been selected for doing, because even in these cases 
selection is supposed to be constitutive of the traitʼs proper function.12 
                                            
12 It is not clear whether the selectionist emphasis renders metaphorically biological 
explanations reductive as well, and I will not explore this question in the present paper 
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I have argued that Millikanʼs undue emphasis on selection reveals her conflation of 
explanation at the level of populations with explanation at the level of causes operating 
within populations.  It may be that this conflation is a side effect of her warranted 
commitment to the importance of accounting for biological purposes in terms of ultimate 
explanations.  It may be that she assumes that ultimate explanations have to be 
selectionist explanations (see paper two of this dissertation).  This view is shared by 
many biologists, beginning with Mayr (1988) who is acknowledged as the father of the 
proximate/ultimate distinction, even though it is unwarranted (Dewsbury 1999, Ariew 
2003, Laland et. al 2011).  These commitments may have led her to assume that 
because proper functions require ultimate explanation, they must be framed in terms of 
selection.  However, although it is true that selectionist explanations are ultimate ones, it 
is not true that if an explanation is ultimate, then it must be framed in terms of selection.   
Millikan could, if she wished, abandon the selection requirement while offering ultimate 
explanations that are framed in terms of fitness. 
7.  Three case studies 
I will now consider whether the theory of proper functions is reductive in other respects.  
I will do this by investigating whether the theory can handle several sorts of adaptive 
biological phenomena that might be expected to put pressure on it.  To avoid 
complicating matters unnecessarily, I will assume that the proper function of the trait is 
fixed by its effects on fitness rather than by selection. 
I begin with the challenge of explaining how biological learning can produce purposeful 
behaviors.  Some forms of learning are paradigmatically biological (for example, 
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learning to identify kin by means of imprinting mechanisms), while others are not (for 
example, learning trigonometry).  The difference between them may be explained by the 
domain-specificity of biological learning and the domain-generality of non-biological 
learning.13 The idea is that biological learning is the result of an evolved neural device 
that is geared toward causing the animal to learn one specific kind of thing, in contrast 
to learning mechanisms that can be applied more generally to a wide range of learning 
tasks.14   
Animal song is an interesting arena for exploring the interface between learning and 
evolution.  Songs are species-specific acoustical signals that are typically produced by 
males in the context of courtship or territorial defense.  Most animals that produce song 
do not have to learn their songs, but humans, cetaceans, certain bats, and some birds 
are exceptions (Kroodsma & Miller 1996).   
Vocalization by songbirds is a well understood example of learned signaling. Birdsong 
has a biological purpose; namely, attracting mates and establishing territorial 
boundaries. Because these purposes are mediated by learning, the theory of proper 
                                            
13 By this criterion the example of operant conditioning given earlier is not an example of 
biological learning, because the ratʼs learning to press the bar is the upshot of a domain-
general learning mechanism. 
14 In some cases, the production of signaling behavior is unlearned but appropriate 
responses to the signal must be learned in whole or in part.  Honeybee dances are an 
example. Although there is no evidence that the dances are learned, learning influences 
the manner in which observer bees respond to dances (Biesmeijer & Seeley 2005, 
Grüter et al, 2008). 
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functions cannot accommodate them unless it is consistent with the existence of learned 
biological purposes.  
Comparative neurobiological research suggests that songbirds are born with an evolved 
learning device (the “song system”). The song system enables them to produce songs, 
learn songs, and evaluate and correct the fidelity of the songs that they have learned.  It 
is transmitted genetically, and probably became established in the songbird lineage 
because singing species-appropriate songs enhanced the fitness of ancestral songbirds 
(Brainard & Doupe 2002).  Given these facts, one can say that the song system has the 
proper function of causing birds to produce species-appropriate songs. Now, saying that 
a device has a proper function does not entail anything about the proximate 
mechanisms by means of which its proper function is realized.15  These might include a 
whole range of causal processes, including learning.  In the case at hand, the song 
system fulfills its function by biasing song learning towards species-appropriate songs 
(Dooling & Searcy 1980, Nelson & Marler 1993, Marler & Peters 1988).  In other cases 
of vocal signaling, the proper function of the neural device is realized by means of 
different proximate mechanisms. For example, the suboscine passerines, a group of 
birds that are closely related to the songbirds, do not learn their songs. Their singing 
patterns are highly canalized and not dependent upon acoustic inputs (Beecher & 
                                            
15 In Millikanian jargon, an itemʼs having a proper function is distinguished from the 
historically normal explanation of how items of that type perform the function.  An item is 
said to perform its proper function in a historically normal way when it does so by means 
of the same proximate mechanisms as were operative in its Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptedness. 
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Brenowitz 2005). Their song system realizes its proper function by means of proximate 
mechanisms that are different from those in the songbird case, even though in both 
cases the song system has the same proper function.  So, correctly understood, the 
theory of proper functions does not have unacceptable nativist entailments, and it is 
consistent with purposeful behaviors resulting from biological learning. 
The second topic that I wish to address in this section is the question of whether the 
theory of proper functions is compatible with the existence of novel adaptive behaviors. 
These are behaviors that have the purpose of adapting an organism to a current 
environmental circumstance that had no evolutionary precedent. Consider again 
honeybee dances.  Once the signaling system became established in the honeybee 
lineage, there must have been many occasions when foraging bees found nectar in 
locations (relative to the hive) where it had never been previously found.  It is 
reasonable to suppose that bees were able to signal information about these novel 
locations because they were equipped with a neural system that systematically maps 
nectar locations onto dances.  The dance-producing mechanism is an example of a 
neural device that has the proper function of responding flexibly to a range of possible 
environmental contingencies.  The theory of proper functions has no difficulty 
accommodating novel adaptive behavior in cases where it is a function of an evolved 
mechanism that systematically adjusts behaviors to environmental contingencies.  
The last challenge that I wish to discuss concerns adaptive developmental plasticity.  
Developmental plasticity is defined as: 
 29 
[A] single genotypeʼs ability to alter its developmental processes and phenotypic 
outcomes in response to different environmental conditions.  Such environmental 
effects on trait expression can range from modest adjustments to growth rate or 
tissue allocation in response to resource levels, to dramatic polyphenic switches 
by which a single genotype can give rise to discrete and often radically different 
alternative phenotypes (Moczek et. al. 2011: 1). 
This might be thought to present a problem for the theory of proper functions.  If 
phenotypes can vary as a function of environmental factors, and these variations are 
purposeful, then the purposes of phenotypic traits do not seem to have been fixed by 
evolution. Consider the developmental trajectory of water fleas (Daphnia pulex) that 
have been exposed to kairomones (chemical traces indicating the presence of 
predators) Daphnia that have been exposed to kairomones from the tadpole shrimp 
(Triops cancriformis) during their development respond by growing helmets, tail-spines, 
and neck teeth.  These features have the purpose of protecting them from predation 
(Ebert 2011).   
The developmental pathways underpinning adaptive plasticity are not well understood.  
One hypothesis cites mechanisms that buffer phenotypes against environmentally 
induced developmental disturbances.  These mechanisms prevent mutations from being 
expressed, and therefore may allow mutations to accumulate in a lineage over time.  At 
some point, an environmental change, or a mutation that makes the organism more 
sensitive to some feature of the environment, might trigger their expression, and this 
might have dramatic phenotypic consequences.  In the very occasional cases where the 
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resulting phenotype enhances fitness, if the condition that triggers their expression 
occurs often enough, the mutations responsible for the adaptive trait may persist in the 
lineage (Moczek et. al. 2011).  The trait then acquires a proper function.  So, if 
developmentally plastic traits are preserved in the lineage because they enhanced 
ancestral fitness, and the manner in which they enhanced fitness is also preserved, 
then the theory of proper functions has no difficulty accounting for their purposefulness. 
8.  An overextended biological explanation 
The fact that a theory does not entail reductive consequences does not prevent its 
advocates misusing it to draw reductive conclusions.  In this section, I discuss one such 
example taken from Millikanʼs work.   This example is informative because it reveals a 
reductive component of Millikanʼs philosophical agenda.  But it is even more important 
because it shows how an example of an overextended evolutionary explanation casts 
light on the proper limits of such explanations. 
Earlier I pointed out that talk about purpose can be ambiguous.  On one hand, “having a 
purpose” can refer to intentional states or intentionally designed items, and on the other, 
it can refer to non-intentional items or their products.  I have also urged that it is 
plausible that neural systems with non-intentional purposes provide a biological platform 
for purposes in the first, intentional sense.  It seems reasonable to suppose that our 
capacity to entertain a belief-desire psychology grew out of neurological structures that 
contributed to our ancestorsʼ fitness.  This modest claim does not entail that the 
underlying neurology was selected for, or even that it enhanced our ancestorsʼ fitness 
by making it possible to form intentions. 
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But one might wonder whether the ambiguity noted above points to a deeper 
relationship between the two kinds of purposes.  Perhaps proper function theory can do 
more than merely explain non-intentional aims and their associated norms.  Perhaps it 
can give us an account of purposiveness and normativity per se – including intentional 
purposes and prescriptive norms.   Millikan thinks so.  Her aspirations for the theory of 
proper functions go well beyond using it to account for how non-intentional items can be 
purposive and subject to norms.  She believes that the theory can yield an account of 
intentional purposes and their related norms.  If this project can succeed, it would be a 
hugely significant philosophical achievement.  But can it succeed?  I will argue that it 
cannot, and that attempts to extend the theory of proper functions to the intentional 
sphere overstep the limits of biological explanation.   
Starkly put, Millikan wishes to argue that all purposes are biological purposes.  “My 
thesis,” she writes, “will be that the unexpressed purposes that lie behind acts of explicit 
purposing [i.e., intentional purposing] are biological purposes…. Biological purposes 
are, roughly, functions fulfilled in accordance with evolutionary design” (1993a: 217) and 
“the normative element that is involved when one means to follow a rule is biological 
purposiveness” (222).   
In her most explicit discussion of the relation between intentional purposes and 
biological ones, Millikan (2004) contrasts the biological purpose of the eye-blink reflex 
with the intentional purpose of allowing an ophthalmologist to administer eye-drops.  
She states, plausibly enough, that the purpose of the eye-blink reflex is to prevent 
foreign objects from entering the eye.  She then goes on to say that our irresistible 
 32 
tendency to blink even though we desire the medicine to enter our eyes is best 
understood as a case of conflicting purposes, and that both of these purposes are the 
same kind of thing. 
Maybe you will object that only one of these crossing purposes is a real purpose.  
The other is a “purpose” not literally but only by analogy or metaphorically.  The 
real purpose is the conscious human intention not to blink.  Only the intention not 
to blink is a purpose of the whole person, rather than merely a “subpersonal” 
purpose.  The purpose of the eye-blink reflex is only a “subpersonal” or 
“biological” purpose, and these are purposes only metaphorically (3). 
Given that the purpose of the eye-blink reflex is just its proper function, the claim that 
proper functions are real purposes is the claim that they are metaphysically on a par 
with intentional purposes.  She goes on to claim that the proper functions of parts of 
humans and the intentional purposes of whole humans, although seemingly distinct, are 
actually two manifestations of the very same thing.  “[N]o interesting theoretical line can 
be drawn between these two kinds of purposes,” she writes, because “purposes of the 
whole person are made up out of intertwined purposes at ʻlowerʼ or more ʻbiologicalʼ 
levels” (ibid.).   
There are two reasons why this picture should be rejected.  The first concerns her claim 
that proper functions constitute intentional purposes, and the second concerns her claim 
that there is no interesting theoretical difference between biological purposes and 
intentional purposes because the latter are constituted by the former. 
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With regard to the first objection, notice that intentional purposes are mental states with 
causal powers.  For example, having the intention to make a pot of coffee is being in a 
state that disposes one to make a pot of coffee.  In contrast, biological purposes are 
non-causal, historically determined standards of functioning.  Millikanʼs explanatory 
framework is predicated on the idea that (proximate) states come apart from (ultimate) 
biological purposes.  That it is possible for biological items to fail to do what they are for 
doing is what accounts for the normative dimension of biological systems.  It light of this 
it is difficult to make sense of Millikanʼs claim that there is no fundamental theoretical 
difference between intentional purposes (causally efficacious states of mind) and 
biological purposes (noncausal standards of performance).  Her position amounts to an 
abandonment of the very theoretical apparatus that supposedly underpins it.  
With regard to the second objection, it cannot be the case, as Millikan claims, that an 
itemʼs being composed of biologically purposive parts is sufficient for its being 
intentionally purposive. Non-intentional systems (for example, kidneys) are also 
composed from items with proper functions, but kidneys are not intentionally purposive.  
This is a special case of the much more general principle that the properties of a thing 
cannot be inferred from the properties of its parts (of which Millikan is well aware).  So 
she cannot intelligibly claim that mental states are intentionally purposive because they 
are constructed out of biologically purposive parts.   
 In conclusion, Millikanʼs effort to reduce intentional purposes to proper functions cannot 
succeed.  In attempting to do this, she not only oversteps the limits of evolutionary 
biological explanation, but also undermines the foundations of her own theoretical 
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apparatus.  In her hands, biological explanation can, at least in principle, take one to the 
threshold of intentional psychology by giving an account of the biologically purposive 
neural systems that provide the basis for intentional projects and instrumental norms, 
but it does not have the resources to explain the content of those purposes and norms 
by citing their evolutionary history. 
9.  Conclusion 
My goal in this paper has been to evaluate the strengths and limitations of Ruth 
Millikanʼs philosophical appropriation of evolutionary biology.  I have shown that her key 
use of evolutionary theory is to give a naturalistic account of non-intentional norms and 
purposes both inside and outside the biological domain.  This is an important 
achievement.  However, in insisting that items can have proper functions only on the 
condition that they have been selected for, Millikan conflates a description of the 
proliferation of traits in a population with an account that explains the fitness-enhancing 
characteristics of biological characters.  This selectionist aspect of her theory is both 
reductive and also leads to unintuitive conclusions about the purposes of features of 
organisms.  This shortcoming aside, the theory of proper functions emerges as a 
powerful and flexible tool that is consistent with a scientific understanding of a range of 
biological phenomena, including domain-specific learning, developmental plasticity, and 
adaptively novel behavior.  However, as is shown by Millikanʼs attempt to give a 
reductive analysis of intentional purposes, the theory comes apart when it is pushed 
beyond its proper explanatory limits (as all theories do).   
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The results of my analysis of Millikanʼs project can be distilled into two very general 
lessons about the philosophical use of evolutionary theory.  The first is that, suitably 
amended, the theory of proper functions provides a robust, empirically defensible 
strategy for addressing a wide range of purpose-like and normative-like phenomena in 
several arenas.  The second is that her failed attempt to undo the distinction between 
personal and subpersonal levels of analysis, and to give a reductive account of the 
former in terms of the latter, underscores the importance of resisting the temptation to 
use evolutionary theory to address questions that can only be addressed by citing 
proximate mechanisms (by conflating ultimate why-explanations with proximate how-
explanations).16  Unless one keeps oneʼs eyes firmly fixed on this methodological ball, 
one ends up trying to force evolutionary theory to do more explanatory work than it can 
possibly accomplish. 
 
                                            
16 This kind of category error is rampant in the literature of evolutionary psychology as 
well as philosophical work predicated on the “results” of evolutionary psychological 
research, and even very sophisticated thinkers like Millikan sometimes fall victim to it 
(See Buller 1999). 
 36 
REFERENCES 
 
Abrams, M. (2005).  Teleosemantics without selection. Biology and Philosophy, 20: 97-
116. 
Amundson, R. (2000).  Against normal function.  Studies of History and Philosophy of 
Science, Part C, 31: 33-53. 
Anderson, S. R. (2004). Doctor Dolittleʼs Delusion: Animals and the Uniqueness of 
Human Language. New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press.  
Ariew, A. (2003).  Ernst Mayrʼs ultimate/proximate distinction reconstructed and 
reconsidered.  Biology and Philosophy, 18: 553-565. 
Beecher, M. D. and Brenowitz, E. A. (2005).  Functional aspects of song learning in 
songbirds.  Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 20: 143-149. 
Beismeijer, J. & Seeley, T. (2005). The use of waggle dance information by honeybees 
throughout their foraging careers.  Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 59: 133-
142. 
Boorse, C. (1976). Wright on functions. The Philosophical Review, 85: 70–86. 
Boorse, C. (2002). A rebuttal on functions.  In Ariew, A., Cummins, R. & Perlman, M. 
(eds.), Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
 37 
Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. (1985).  Culture and the Evolutionary Process.  Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Brigandt, I. & Love, A. (2012). Reductionism in Biology. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/reduction-biology/>. 
Brainard, M. S. & Doupe, A. J. (2002).  What songbirds teach us about learning.  
Nature, 417, 351-358. 
Buller, D. J. (1998).  Etiological theories of function: a geographical survey.  Biology and 
Philosophy, 13: 505-527. 
Buller, D. J. (1999). Defreuding evolutionary psychology: adaptation and human 
motivation.  In Buller, D. J. & Hardcastle, V. G. (eds.), Where Biology Meets 
Psychology.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Buskes, C. (2013).  Darwinism extended: a survey of how the idea of cultural evolution 
evolved.  Philosophia, 41: 661-691. 
Campbell, D. (1974a).  Evolutionary epistemology.  In Schlipp, P. A. (ed.), The 
Philosophy of Karl Popper.  LaSalle: Open Court. 
Campbell, D. (1974b).  Unjustified variation and selective retention in scientific 
discovery.  In Ayala, F. J. & Dobzhansky. T. (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of 
Biology.  London: Macmillan. 
Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. & Feldman, M. W. (1981).  Cultural Transmission and Evolution.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 38 
Crane, T. (2006). Brentano's concept of intentional inexistence. In Textor, M. (ed.), The 
Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy. New York: Routledge. 
Crist, E. (2004). Can an insect speak?  The case of the honeybee dance language.  
Social Studies of Science, 34 (1), 7-43.  
Cummins, R.  (1975). Functional analysis. Journal of Philosophy, 72: 741-765.  
Davies, P. S. (2003). Norms of Nature: Naturalism and the Nature of Functions.  
Cambridge, MA: MIT. 
Dawkins, R. (1976).  The Selfish Gene.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dennett, D. C. (1995).  Darwinʼs Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life.  
New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Dewsbury, D. A. (1999).  The proximate and ultimate: past, present, and future.  
Behavioral Processes,  46(3): 189-199. 
Dooling, R. and Searcy, M. (1980).  Early perceptual selectivity in the swamp sparrow.  
Developmental Psychobiology, 13: 499-506. 
Dover, G. (2000).  Dear Mr. Darwin: Letters on the Evolution of Life and Human Nature.  
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Dretske, F. (1997).  Naturalizing the Mind.  New York: Bradford. 
Dretske, F. (1986). Misrepresentation. In Bogdan, R. (ed.), Belief: Form, Content and 
Function. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Ebert, D. (2011).  A genome for the environment.  Science, 331: 539-540. 
 39 
Ereshefsky, M. (1998).  Species pluralism and anti-realism.  Philosophy of Science, 65: 
103-120. 
Gallistel, C. R. (1989). Animal cognition: the representation of space, time and number.  
Annual Review of Psychology, 40: 155-189 
Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment.  
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (1993). Functions: consensus without unity.  Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly, 74: 196-208.  
Gould, J. (1975). Honey bee recruitment: the dance-language controversy.  Science, 
189 (4204): 685-693. 
Grüter, C. et al. (2008). Informational conflicts created by the waggle dance.  
Proceedings of the Royal Society, 275: 1321-1327. 
Hull, D. L. (1988).  Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of Social and 
Conceptual Development of Science.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hull, D. L., Langman, R. E., and Glenn, S. S. (2001). A general account of selection: 
biology, immunology, and behavior.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24: 511-
528. 
Joyce, E. (2006).  The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Kornblith, H. (2005).  Knowledge and its Place in Nature.  New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 40 
Kroodsma, D.E. and Miller, E.H. (eds.) (1996) Ecology and Evolution of Acoustic 
Communication in Birds.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Laland, K. N. et al. (2011) Is Mayrʼs proximate/ultimate dichotomy still useful?  Science, 
334: 1512-1516. 
Lewis, D. K. (1986). Causal explanation. Philosophical Papers, Volume 2.  New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Lewontin, R. C. (1970).  The units of selection.  Annual Review of Ecology and 
Systematics, 1: 1-18. 
Marler, P. and Peters, S. (1988).  The role of song phonology and syntax in vocal 
learning preferences in the songsparrow, Melospiza melodia.  Ethology,  77: 
125–149. 
Mayr, E. (1988).  Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language Thought and Other Biological Categories: New 
Foundations for Realism.  Cambridge, MA: MIT. 
Millikan, R. G. (1986). Thoughts without laws: cognitive science with content.  
Philosophical Review, 95: 47-80.  
Millikan, R. G. (1993a). Truth rules, hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox. In 
White Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. Cambridge, MA: MIT.   
Millikan, R. G. (1993b). Propensities, exaptations, and the brain.  In White Queen 
Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. Cambridge, MA: MIT.  
 41 
Millikan, R. G. (1993c). In defense of proper functions.  In White Queen Psychology and 
Other Essays for Alice. Cambridge, MA: MIT.  
Millikan, R. G. (1996).  On swampkinds.  Mind and Language, 11(1): 103-117. 
Millikan, R. G. (2002). Biofunctions: two paradigms. In Cummins, R. & Ariew, A. & 
Perlman, M. (eds.), Function: New Readings in Philosophy of Psychology and 
Biology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
Millikan, R. G. (2004). Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT.  
Millikan, R. G. (2005). The language-thought partnership: a birdʼs-eye view.  In 
Language: A Biological Model.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
Millikan, R. G. (2006). Mental content, teleological theories of.  Encyclopedia of 
Cognitive Science.  DOI: 10.1002/0470018860.s00128 
Moczek, A. P. et al. (2011).  The role of developmental plasticity in evolutionary 
innovation.  Proceedings of the Royal Society B, Biological Sciences, 
doi:10.1098/rspb.2011.0971. 
Mossio, M.; Saborido, C.; Moreno, A. (2009).  An organizational account of biological 
functions.  British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 60(4): 813-841. 
Neander, K.  (1991a). Functions as selected effects: the conceptual analystʼs defense. 
Philosophy of Science, 58: 168–184. 
Neander, K. (1991b). The teleological notion of ʻfunctionʼ.  Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, 69: 454–468. 
 42 
Neander, K. (2012).  Toward an informational teleosemantics.  In Kingsbury, J. & Ryder 
(eds.), Millikan and Her Critics. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Nelson, D. A. and  Marler, P. (1993). Innate recognition of song in white-crowned 
sparrows: a role in selective vocal learning? Animal Behavior, 46: 806–808. 
Okrent, M. (2007).  Rational Animals: The Teleological Roots of Intentionality.  Athens, 
OH: University of Ohio Press. 
Papineau, D. (1986) Representation and explanation.  Philosophy of Science, 51: 550-
572. 
Pargetter, R. & Bigelow, R. (1987).  Functions.  The Journal of Philosophy, 84(4): 181-
196. 
Popper, K. R. (1972).  Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Preston, B. (1998). Why is a wing like a spoon? A pluralist theory of functions.  The 
Journal of Philosophy, 95: 215-254. 
Preston, B. (2009).  Biological and cultural proper functions in comparative perspective.   
In Krohs, U. & Kroes, P. (eds.), Functions in Biological and Artificial Worlds.  
Cambridge, MA: MIT. 
Rescorla, M. (2013).  Millikan on honeybee navigation and communication.  In Ryder et 
al. (eds.), Millikan and Her Critics.  New York: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Salmon, W. (1984). Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 43 
Schroeder, T. (2004).  New norms of teleosemantics.  In Clapin, H. et. al. (eds.), 
Representation in Mind: Vol. 1, New Approaches to Mental Representation 
(Perspectives on Cognitive Science).  New York: Elsevier. 
Seager, W.  (1999). Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment.  
London: Routledge. 
Seet, B. et al. (2001).  Myopia in Singapore: taking a public health approach.  British 
Journal of Ophthalmology, 85: 521-526. 
Skyrms, Brian (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Skyrms, B. (2010). Signals: Evolution, Learning, & Information. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press.  
Sober, E. (1984).  The Nature of Selection.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Stegmann, U. E. (2013). Animal Communication Theory: Information and Influence.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Street, S. (2006).  A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value. Philosophical 
Studies 127: 109-66. 
Toulmin, S. (1972).  Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of 
Concepts.  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
West-Eberhard, M. J. (2003). Developmental Plasticity and Evolution.  New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 44 
Wilson, E. O. (1975).  Sociobiology: The New Synthesis.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Wright, L. (1973). Functions. The Philosophical Review, 82: 139–168. 
Wright, L. (1976). Teleological Explanation.  Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press. 
 
 
 45 
CHAPTER 2 
Evolution, Human Behavior, and Explanation:  
Inferential Problems with Evolutionary Psychology 
 
1.  Introduction 
Evolutionary psychologists believe that they have an inferential strategy that allows 
them to give accurate evolutionary explanations for contemporary human behavior.  In 
this paper I call the strategy into question, and argue that it is methodologically 
unsound.  The structure of the paper is as follows.  In Section Two I discuss the 
historical and intellectual context from which evolutionary psychology emerged and go 
on to discuss some of the core theoretical commitments of the discipline.  In Section 
Three, I identify several conditions that must be satisfied in order for evolutionary 
psychological inferences to go through.  In Section Four, I consider the 
proximate/ultimate distinction and the role of ultimate explanations in evolutionary 
psychology.  In the fifth section, I discuss the problem of individuating behaviors in a 
way that permits one to make inferences about their ultimate evolutionary functions, and 
I show that this problem is fatal to the evolutionary psychological enterprise.  In Section 
Six, I consider how the claim that human psychology has been conserved since the 
EEA ought to be understood.  In Section Seven, I illustrate my critique of evolutionary 
psychology using an example from the literature, and in section eight, I conclude with 
some final thoughts.   
2. The discipline and its core commitments  
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Explaining human behavior in terms of its biological roots is not new.  Darwin treated 
human behavior, as he did other aspects of organisms, as the result of evolutionary 
processes, and he forecast that evolutionary theory would one day provide new 
foundations for psychology.17  Since Darwinʼs work, many advocates of evolutionary 
explanations of human behavior have held (sometimes tacitly) views about human 
nature which, they believe, are underwritten by evolutionary theory (Young 1985, 
Segerstralle 2001).  Although these views about human nature are not entailed by the 
theory of evolution, their proponents often presume that they are.   
These explanatory endeavors often have a normative dimension: they not only seek to 
tell us what we are – when they are descriptive – but also, crucially, suggest how we as 
natural creatures should be.  They very often endorse the idea that certain innate, 
biologically-fixed characteristics of our species set limits on what we can become (the 
idea that certain aspects of human behavior are inevitable or nearly inevitable) and that 
these characteristics dictate the conditions for human fulfillment – roughly, that we 
cannot be happy or lead fulfilling lives unless we live in ways that are in some sense 
natural for us (Antony 2000).  One effect of this trend has been to undercut, or at least 
to displace, explanatory projects in which a greater emphasis is placed on the causal 
significance of cultural landscapes (Prinz 2012).  Those who advocate this approach to 
explaining human behavior argue that culture sits on a biological platform, and they 
                                            
17 “In the distant future I see open fields for more important researches. Psychology will 
be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power 
and capacity by gradation (Darwin 1859: 424).”  See also Richards (2003). 
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claim that it constrains the degree to which we are psychologically and behaviorally 
malleable.18   
The biological approach to explaining human behavior came to fruition during the 
1970s, when the discipline of sociobiology was born.  Sociobiologists championed 
evolutionary theoryʼs explanatory power to give true origin explanations of the social 
lives of animals, including human beings.  Human sociobiologists focused specifically on 
human behavior and they believed that their efforts showed that many of our behaviors 
have their roots in our evolutionary history.  They believed that behaviors are brought 
about by genetic elements and have been subject to natural selection, and that like 
other genetically based features of organisms, behaviors are inherited.  The goal of the 
project was to demonstrate that behaviors, in this case human behaviors, are largely 
explicable in terms of the genes which cause them.  But worries about the degree to 
which sociobiology could accommodate facts about behavioral flexibility led to itʼs being 
overtaken by the discipline of evolutionary psychology.  The charge of this newer 
approach to human behavior was to focus on the evolutionary functions of the proximate 
psychological mechanisms which bring behaviors about (Crawford and Krebs 2008).  
Evolutionary psychologists believe that the cognitive mechanisms responsible for 
human behavior came into being through evolution by natural selection.  More 
specifically, they claim that the mind is composed of numerous systems called 
                                            
18 For a powerful corrective to this view, see Henrich et al. (2010). 
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“cognitive modules” that were designed by natural selection for performing highly 
specialized tasks: predator avoidance, mate selection, cheater detection, etc.   
The claim that the human mind contains specialized modules was first advanced by 
Fodor (1983), who argued that only input systems – the channels through which 
sensory input enters the mind – are modular.  He argued that mental operations such as 
belief fixation, inference making, and so on, are not performed by modules, but are 
performed by domain-general “central” processing.19  Fodorian modules have nine 
defining characteristics.  They are informationally encapsulated (that is, they cannot 
draw on information residing elsewhere in the mind),20 they are inaccessible to 
consciousness, they are mandatory (that is automatic rather than under conscious 
control), they process information very rapidly, they are shallow (that us they use 
relatively few computational resources), they are dissociable (so, damage to a module 
produces only highly selective, rather than global, cognitive impairment), they are 
localizable in particular neural circuits in the brain, they are domain specific (each has a 
narrow range of inputs), and they are innate (in Fodorʼs [1983] words, they “develop 
according to specific, endogenously determined patterns under the impact of 
environmental releasers”) (100). 
                                            
19 It had important precursors in linguistics (Chomsky 1980), systems theory (Simon 
1962) and vision science (Marr 1982). 
20 More precisely, “A cognitive system is informationally encapsulated to the extent that 
the computational operations of the system are insensitive to information from outside 
the system itself” (Robbins 2012: 642).  For Fodor, informational encapsulation is the 
key element of modularity.  
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The Fodorian account is a version of “modest modularity.”  In contrast, evolutionary 
psychologists claim that the human mind consists entirely of modules.  This is known as 
the massive modularity hypothesis.  Empirical evidence in support of massive 
modularity is very weak (Buller & Hardcastle 2000, Prinz 2006, Robbins 2013).  
However, Cosmides and Tooby (1992, 2005) experimentally investigated the 
psychology of social exchange, and claimed that their findings vindicate the massive 
modularity hypothesis.  They used a modification of what is known as the Wason 
Selection Task to investigate how we think about deontic rules.  The original version of 
the Wason Selection Task was designed to test how subjects think about material 
conditionals.  They are presented with four cards lying on a table and are told that each 
has a numeral on one side and a letter on the other.  The first card shows an even 
numeral, the second shows a vowel, the third shows an odd numeral, and the fourth 
card shows a consonant.  Subjects are then asked which two cards need to be turned 
over to test the claim “If a card has an even numeral showing, then it has a vowel on the 
other side.”  Overwhelmingly, the majority of subjects fail to understand that they must 
turn over the first and fourth cards to test the claim.  Based on the assumption that 
human beings evolved a finely-tuned social intelligence, Cosmides and Tooby predicted 
that when subjects are asked how to test a social rule, one that is a logical equivalent to 
the material conditional (“if one is under 18, then one is not permitted to drink alcoholic 
beverages”) they would be able to specify what is required.  This turned out to be the 
case.  Cosmides and Tooby interpreted this result as showing that the human mind is 
equipped with a domain-specific “cheater-detection module” that was installed in our 
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ancestors during the Pleistocene, and which we modern humans have inherited from 
them.  The interpretation of their results has drawn extensive and strong criticisms (e.g., 
Samuels 1989, Davies et al. 1995, Cheng & Holyoak 1989, Manktelow & Over 1990, 
Sperber, et al. 1995, Atran 2001, Mallon 2008, Fodor 2008) and it is obvious that their 
claim about an evolved cheater detection module goes very far beyond the evidence 
provided by their study. 
Given the lack of empirical evidence, it is not surprising that arguments for the massive 
modularity hypothesis are mainly theory-driven.  There are three main theoretical 
arguments for massive modularity.  The one that is most often cited in the literature 
concerns the adaptiveness of a modular mind.  It is sometimes called the “Argument 
From Design”. 21  Recall that evolutionary psychologists believe that human behavior 
can be understood as being caused by a psychology that was selected for in the past 
because that psychology was responsive to adaptive challenges.  Specialized modules 
were better at handling such challenges than a general-purpose intelligence would have 
been.  Selection would therefore have favored such an architecture.  Therefore, the 
mind has a modular architecture (Cosmides & Tooby 1992). 
What is it that distinguishes evolutionary psychological modules from Fodorian ones?  
Giving a precise answer to this question is complicated by the fact that there are several 
notions of modularity found in the literature (Robbins 2013).  Fortunately, these fine 
                                            
21 The other two arguments are sometimes called the “Argument from Evolvability” and 
the “Argument from Computational Tractability.” All three arguments, and objections to 
them, are nicely set out by Robbins (2009, 2013).  See also Carruthers (2006). 
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distinctions do not make a difference to the arguments in the present paper, so I will 
limit my remarks to features that all of them share.  I have already mentioned that 
Fodorian modules are peripheral while “Darwinian modules” (as Bermúdez [2005] calls 
them) are both peripheral and central.  This core difference has a crucial theoretical 
entailment.  It forces evolutionary psychologists to abandon the claim that modules are 
informationally encapsulated (Robbins 2013).  They retain all of the other Fodorian 
properties, but insist that modules are able to draw on information generated by other 
modules.  There are also some restrictions placed on domain specificity.  The modules 
postulated by evolutionary psychologists are supposed to have been sensitive to certain 
reproductively significant features in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness 
(EEA).  The Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness consists of the environment(s) in 
which ancestral organisms faced pressures of living and evolved adaptations in 
response to them.  An animal is said to be “in the EEA” as long as it remains in an 
environment in which those challenges which gave rise to its phenotypic adaptations 
persist.  In the case of human beings, our present anatomy and physiology were almost 
entirely in place by approximately 200,000 years ago (Conroy 2005).  The environments 
in which human beings live now are, for almost all of us, importantly different from the 
environment in which our prehistoric ancestors evolved.  According to evolutionary 
psychologists, although we are no longer in the EEA, our evolved, modular psychology 
remains adapted to the conditions that obtained in the EEA; “Our modern skulls house a 
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stone age mind” (Cosmides & Tooby 1997).  We have a psychology that is 
indistinguishable from that of Homo sapiens some 200,000 years ago.22   
It is clear from this that evolutionary psychology is committed to a nativist account of the 
mind.  Since our present-day psychology is constituted by mechanisms which were 
present a very long time ago, and which have changed very little if at all since that time, 
contemporary human behaviors are best interpreted along the same lines as their 
counterparts in the EEA.  Evolutionary psychologists conceive of cognitive modules as 
“very sophisticated computers, whose circuits are elegantly designed to solve the kinds 
of problems our ancestors routinely faced…. Behavior in the present is generated by 
information-processing mechanisms that exist because they solved adaptive problems 
in the past” (Cosmides & Tooby 1997: 91).   
Computational approaches to the mind typically describe mental processes as 
“software” that is acquired by learning and is run on neural “hardware”.  But in order for 
a trait to come under selection, as evolutionary psychologists claim our cognitive 
information-processing systems did, the cognitive programs must be genetically 
transmissible.  Consequently, the software has to be built into the hardware (hard-
wired), rather than programmed into it by learning.  This is why evolutionary 
psychologists claim that humans have a deeply rooted psychological organization that is 
                                            
22 It is worth noting that, although evolutionary psychologists speak about adaptations 
that arose during the Pleistocene there are features of our nervous system that 
emerged much earlier.  Thanks to Richard Boyd for pointing this out to me. (See also 
Downes 2010).   
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embodied in structural features of the brain.  A strong sort of nativism is therefore 
indispensible to evolutionary psychologists, and they gladly embrace it.  This is made 
clear in Cosmides and Toobyʼs (1997) characterization of modules as instinct-like 
structures.  They explicitly endorse William Jamesʼ account of instincts, and use it to 
underwrite their conception of how the mind is organized.  James (1887) considered 
instincts to be reflex-like behaviors that “produce certain ends, without foresight of the 
ends, and without previous education in the performance” (355).  Like instincts, modules 
are said to be innately disposed to bring about certain behaviors.  Now, claims that 
human behaviors are instinctive or instinct-like must accommodate the fact that human 
behavior exhibits a remarkable degree of plasticity (e.g., Ramachandran 1993, Joblonka 
& Lamb 2005, Ghalambor, Angeloni, & Carroll 2010, Prinz 2012, Fedyk in press).  We 
are able to meet novel situations in novel ways and to modify our behaviors in response 
to anticipated outcomes.  But such flexibility is hard to reconcile with the claim that 
human behavior is controlled by instinctual forces.  James addressed this challenge by 
suggesting that behavioral flexibility is explained by our having very many instincts, and 
that a multiplicity of instincts produces the appearance of behavioral flexibility because, 
in any given circumstance, multiple instincts compete for the control of our behavior.  
Similarly, Cosmides and Tooby argue that our flexibility is explained by our brains being 
aggregates of very many (hundreds or thousands of) modules that determine human 
behavior.  But Tooby and Cosmidesʼ use of Jamesʼ account to underwrite a massively 
modular psychology is not entirely coherent.  Notice that Jamesʼ argument presupposes 
that instincts are not domain-specific.  In his view it is only because multiple instincts 
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compete for the control of behavior that humans have behavioral alternatives.  When 
faced with a danger situation, for example, one might have the instinct to fight or the 
instinct to flee.  Suppose that on any occasion where flight or fight is called for, one or 
another of these instincts will end up controlling oneʼs behavior.  The same cannot be 
said of domain-specific modules.  Tooby and Cosmides cannot allow that multiple 
modules compete for control of behavior in a danger situation because each module is 
dedicated to processing information about a single domain.  So the choice to fight 
against or flee from an approaching predator has got to be restricted to a single module 
(call it the “predation-avoidance module”).23  If this is the case, then individual modules 
exhibit flexibility, and are therefore unlike Jamesian instincts. 
Evolutionary psychologists believe that the theoretical apparatus that I have sketched 
above provides them with a secure foundation for giving explanations of human 
behavior, but it is important to distinguish evolutionary psychological explanations of 
human behavior from evolutionary explanations of human behavior simpliciter.  This is 
particularly important given that evolutionary psychologists often claim that those who 
reject evolutionary psychology but accept evolutionary theory are committed to a 
contradiction (they supposedly believe both that the theory of evolution explains the 
adaptive traits of all biological systems while also denying that evolution explains the 
                                            
23 This raises an important problem about the individuation of modules.  Is there a fight-
or-flight module, or does a “fight” module compete with a “flight” module?  This is a case 
of what is known as the “grain problem” (see Sterelny & Griffiths 1992, Atkinson & 
Wheeler 2003). 
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configuration of the human mind).24  It is important to note that evolutionary theory does 
not entail nativism or massive modularity.  One might reject the theoretical apparatus 
proposed by evolutionary psychologists while still embracing an evolutionary account of 
the human mind.  One might, from an evolutionary perspective, regard the mind as a 
general-purpose learning device that was selected for during the EEA, or as consisting 
of selected-for modular learning systems that are sensitive to environmental 
contingencies outside the EEA.  One might also endorse the view that the mind is 
modular without also holding that these modules emerged during the EEA as products 
of natural selection.  It might be that the mind has a modular organization which was 
acquired ontogenetically (in the lifetimes of individual human beings) rather than 
phylogenetically (in the lifetime of a taxon). There is, for example, an area of the brain 
called the “visual word-form area” that is specialized for reading (it is, in effect, a 
“reading module”).  Written language emerged around 3500 years ago (Woods 2010), 
which is far too recently for reading to have been selected for, suggesting that cognitive 
modules can be acquired by learning (Dehaene 2009, Dehaene & Cohen 2007, see 
also Buller & Hardcastle 2000). 
Although the massive modularity hypothesis is controversial (Samuels 1998, Fodor 
2000, Currie & Sterelny 2000, Buller & Hardcastle 2000, Sterelny 2003, Buller 2005, 
Prinz 2006), I will not attempt to adjudicate it here.  Instead, I will argue that even if it is 
                                            
24 A prime example is Anne Campbellʼs frequently quoted remark that such people 
believe that “evolution stops at the neck” (Campbell 2002:13). 
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indeed true that our prehistoric ancestorsʼ behavior was underwritten by an evolved 
modular psychology, and even if it is true that the contemporary human mind has a 
massively modular organization, this does not license the sorts of inferences that 
evolutionary psychologists characteristically make about the psychology of 
contemporary humans.   
3.   The inferential strategy 
What is the inferential strategy that evolutionary psychologists use?  There are two 
such.  Sometimes they begin by identifying a behavior exhibited by contemporary 
humans, and set about to identify its evolutionary function.  On other occasions they 
speculate about the sorts of recurrent challenges our prehistoric ancestors faced; they 
then speculate about how these were responsible for psychological adaptations; and 
finally, they extrapolate from this to explain features of contemporary psychology.  Both 
kinds of inference rely on practitioners being able to correctly individuate modules.  
Evolutionary psychologists have to have a way of knowing which module causes which 
behavior.  Furthermore, since their explanations rest on the claim that the modules that 
are supposedly hard-wired in human brains are the very same modules that were 
selected for, and that these modules explain both ancestral and contemporary 
behaviors, it is clear that evolutionary psychologists need to have some method for 
inferring which prehistoric modules are identical to which contemporary ones.  Unless 
this can be done it is difficult to see how one can determine the evolutionary functions of 
contemporary behaviors.  However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no discussion 
about this important methodological point in the literature. 
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It is a difficult matter to determine whether a trait was under selection, and what it was 
under selection for doing.  In straightforwardly biological cases, scientists use 
comparative methods, optimality models, and so on, to determine that selection has 
taken place, and that the items under consideration have retained their ancestral 
functions (Sober 2008; Orzack & Sober 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 2001).  But evolutionary 
psychologists are faced with special challenges to establishing that the human mind is 
comprised of many evolved computational structures and that at least some of them 
have retained their evolutionary functions.  For this to happen, at least three things need 
to be accomplished: 1) one must identify the evolved modules, 2) one must provide 
independent support for the claim that each module is responsible for the production of 
certain contemporary behaviors, and 3) one must give evidence for the claim that there 
are functional, non-trivial similarities between contemporary and ancestral behaviors.  
The first requirement is necessary because evolutionary psychologists argue that 
behaviors in the present are caused by cognitive systems which operate today as they 
did in the past.  Recall that each module was supposedly selected for because of its 
specific fitness enhancing effects.  So for example, the mate-procuring module in 
contemporary humans is so characterized because of its fitness effects in the past.  
Because it has that specific function it will not be sensitive to situations that require the 
module that produces behaviors that result in (say) people avoiding poisonous plants.  
Identifying poisonous plants has fitness-enhancing benefits, but one will not get those 
benefits unless there is a module that is sensitive to the appropriate range of stimuli.  
The upshot of this demand is that unless evolutionary psychologists can identify 
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modules they are not going to be able to say that a particular behavior is underwritten 
by a specific module with the evolved function of producing behaviors of this sort, and 
their explanatory project will have difficulty getting off the ground.  The second point 
calls for evidential support.  Suppose that we grant evolutionary psychologists the claim 
that behaviors are caused by special-purpose modules.  Such a concession does not 
necessitate oneʼs accepting their further claims that those modules are 1) the same as 
ancestral ones, and 2) that contemporary behaviors are caused by them.  It is an 
empirical matter whether the modules that caused behaviors in early humans are the 
same as those causing behaviors in humans now.  Unless this is established, one could 
claim that special-purpose modules are acquired ontogenetically rather than inherited 
genetically.   
The final point concerns the grounds for matching contemporary modules with ancestral 
ones.  This has got to be based on functional similarity, and this similarity cannot be 
trivial.  The similarity (between a contemporary and an ancestral module) will not be 
trivial if the function is one that the ancestral module was selected for performing and if 
the contemporary module has the same function in virtue of its descent from the 
ancestral module.  This rules out cases where a contemporary module has function F 
due to learning, and this function happens to be the same as that of an ancestral 
module.  It also rules out cases of functional similarity due to convergent evolution.  
Functional similarity because of selection, which is what evolutionary psychologists 
want, would likely first require structural similarities between modules, but it is not 
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obvious that the cognitive architecture that modern humans have is the same as that 
possessed by our prehistoric ancestors.   
All three conditions must be satisfied for the framework to work.  It is clear that points 2 
and 3 involve de facto judgments that contemporary behaviors and psychological 
phenomena are related to ancestral behaviors and psychological phenomena in a 
homology-like way in virtue of being underwritten by the same modules.  I use the 
expression “homology-like” because although it is tempting to describe the similarity 
relations obtaining between ancestral modules and contemporary modules as 
homologies, they are not homologous in the generally accepted sense of the word.  In 
standard biological usage, “homology”25 pertains to similarities across taxa in virtue of 
common ancestry.  For example, bird wings and human arms are homologous to the 
extent that their structural similarities are due to common descent from reptile forelimbs.  
The sort of similarity that evolutionary psychologists wish to establish is better 
characterized in terms of similarity due to descent of contemporary phenotypes from 
ancestral ones.  Since homology is standardly understood as a “horizontal” relation 
(across taxa), I dub the sort of similarity that is the focus of this paper “vertical 
homology.”  More specifically, the sort of relation with which I am concerned requires 
that the function of an ancestral item is conserved over time (there is similarity or 
                                            
25 I am not changing the meaning of “homology.”  Rather, I am drawing some finer 
distinctions to better represent the sorts of relations that are present in evolutionary 
psychological accounts of human behavior.  Although I will use “homology” to keep 
things simple, it is used to represent similarity within a taxon rather than across taxa. 
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commonality of function due to descent).  Call this strong vertical homology to 
distinguish it from cases where a contemporary item is similar to an ancestral item in 
virtue of the formerʼs descent from the latter, but without the contemporary item having 
the same function as the ancestral item. 
4.  Proximate and ultimate explanations 
Giving evolutionary explanations of human behavior engages the distinction between 
proximate and ultimate explanations, a distinction that was first proposed by Mayr 
(1961). Proximate explanations pertain to the causal processes that are responsible for 
the development of organisms, 26 causes operating in fully developed organisms, as well 
those environmental causes that are external to organisms and which impinge upon 
them.  For example, if I were to offer a proximate explanation of how human kidneys 
work I might note that kidneys are the bodyʼs filtering system and then describe what 
has to happen for this to occur: that blood gets filtered when the pressure that it exerts 
causes a cluster of blood vessels to begin the initial process before a tubular structure 
does the filtering.  I might then specify how these structures perform their functions.  I 
might also mention the developmental processes that bring kidneys into being, as well 
as the role of fluid ingestion, the effects of environmental toxins, and so on.  All such 
explanations gesture at what is going on in a system with kidneys.  Without further non-
                                            
26 Mayr (1961) suggested that development pertains only to the decoding of “genetic 
programs.” My conception is less restrictive and involves the environment, extra-cellular 
mechanisms, etc., as has been suggested by Lewontin (2000).      
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proximate information such explanations provide no guidance about how kidneys came 
about or what their functions are.         
In contrast, ultimate explanations of features of organisms situate those features in an 
evolutionary context.  Such explanations are population-level explanations.  So, an 
ultimate explanation of the human kidney would attribute the initial proliferation of proto-
kidneys to the fitness advantages provided by a mechanism27 for the homeostatic 
regulation of fluid and solute balance in bony fish, and go on to specify how selection 
pressures resulted in gradual modifications that eventually gave rise to the mammalian 
kidney that is able to conserve water while excreting waste.  This is an explanation of 
the function of contemporary human kidneys in light of the capacity of ancestral kidneys 
to enhance the fitness of organisms possessing them.     
How does the proximate/ultimate distinction apply to behavior?  The first thing to note is 
that all behaviors are proximately caused.  The behaviors of early humans and those of 
contemporary peoples were and are caused by mechanisms in them and in us.  So the 
issue is whether and how ultimate explanations apply to at least some of our behaviors.  
To show how the distinction applies in behavioral cases, it is helpful to develop some 
terminology.  I will call behaviors to be explained “target behaviors.”  One gives a 
proximate explanation of a target behavior by citing one or more of the causes operating 
within the organismʼs lifetime that make a difference to the occurrence of the behavior.  
                                            
27 This concerns a causal feature of organisms – itʼs a proximate or set of proximate 
features which have produced certain effects.    
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To illustrate this, it is helpful to use an uncontroversial non-human example.  Consider 
biologistsʼ use of the proximate/ultimate distinction to explain the alarm calls made by 
vervet monkeys.  Alarm calls are made in response to the presence of predators, and 
are proximately caused by factors like perceptions of predators, the causal connection 
between the perceptions and vocalizations, learning to sound the alarm calls correctly, 
the developmental processes that underpin their ability to sound the calls, and so forth.  
A proximate explanation of vervet alarm calls might cite any or all of these factors.  
Tokens of vervet monkeysʼ alarm calls are examples of what I shall hereafter call 
“contemporary target behaviors,” and I shall call explanations of them, citing factors like 
those mentioned above, “proximate explanations of contemporary target behaviors.”   
Ultimate explanations of target behaviors are explanations of what I will call “ancestral 
target behaviors” (target behaviors in the EEA).  Such explanations will be ultimate 
explanations of contemporary target behaviors only on the condition that the ancestral 
target behavior is identical with (is a strong vertical homolog of) a contemporary target 
behavior.  Ultimate explanations concern effects of ancestral phenotypes (including 
behavioral ones) — effects that are taken to have been fitness-enhancing within a 
certain population in the EEA.28  It is important to note that these effects are distinct 
from the proximate causes of the phenotypes which produced them.  Consequently, 
                                            
28 I am assuming, for convenience of expression, that ultimate explanations are 
adaptationist explanations.  While this need not be true, the sort of ultimate explanations 
of interest to evolutionary psychologists, and hence pertinent to this paper, all involve 
adaptationist scenarios. 
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ultimate explanations of features of organisms do not compete with proximate 
explanations of them. 
Consider the alarm call of a contemporary vervet monkey as a target behavior.  One 
offers an ultimate explanation of it by first assuming that the behavior has an 
evolutionary function.  A particular contemporary vervet monkey makes an alarm call 
because making alarm calls is part of the behavioral repertoire of current members of 
the vervet population.  One further assumes that ancestral vervet monkeys that made 
and responded appropriately to alarm calls reproduced more successfully than those 
that did not.  This is because the calls correlated enough of the time with the presence 
of predators and produced appropriate avoidance behaviors in those vervet monkeys 
that heard them.  An additional assumption is that the mechanisms involved in the 
signaling behavior were passed on genetically to vervet monkey offspring and 
eventually proliferated through the entire population.  This kind of inferential process is 
involved in giving ultimate explanations, even when the steps are not made explicit. 
Science tends to privilege proximate causal explanations (Godfrey-Smith 2003), so one 
might wonder about the utility of ultimate explanations.  If some cognitive mechanism 
produced a behavior type and the mechanism was selected for because of the effects of 
the behavior, then one could “black box” its function and focus instead on the interesting 
proximate causes that produced the behavior.  But ultimate explanations do some 
things that proximate causal explanations do not.  They address biological phenomena 
at the level of populations rather than at the level of individuals.  They help us make 
sense of the proliferation of phenotypic traits in populations.  Such explanations also 
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provide an account of what it is for a biological trait to function well, poorly, or not at all.  
Roughly, an item functions well to the extent that it has the effect that accounted for its 
proliferation in the EEA (Millikan 1984).  
Evolutionary psychologists cannot do without ultimate explanations, but it is doubtful 
that the explanatory goals towards which they strive are achievable.  When biologists 
give ultimate explanations of nonhuman animal behavior it is generally the case that 
those animals are still in the EEA.  This is true, for example, of the vervet monkey case 
described above.  In such cases, it is trivially true that the behavior under consideration 
as well as the proximate mechanisms underpinning that behavior are type-identical to a 
corresponding behavior and the mechanisms that underpinned it in the EEA.  But this 
principle does not apply in the case of human beings.  The circumstances of 
contemporary human life are, in very many respects, quite different from those in which 
our species evolved.  Ultimate explanations of contemporary human target behaviors 
(and the psychology underpinning them) therefore depend on identifying vertical 
homologs of those behaviors (and the psychology underpinning them).  This is not a 
straightforward task.   
It is important to distinguish ultimate explanations of human behavior and psychology 
from explanations that only appear to be ultimate ones.  I call explanations of the first 
kind “real ultimate explanations,” and explanations of the second kind “allegedly ultimate 
explanations.”  In what follows, I shall argue that explanations of human behavior of the 
sort typically given by evolutionary psychologists are allegedly ultimate explanations 
rather than real ones. 
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5. Individuating behaviors  
Evolutionary psychologists assume that human behaviors, and their underlying modular 
psychology, came about because of selection for them, and that they have been 
retained with their original selected-for functions.  The upshot is that target behaviors 
are vertical homologs of ancestral target behaviors in virtue of the fact that the modules 
that cause them are vertical homologs of ancestral modules that were selected in the 
EEA for causing just such behaviors.  I emphasize these points because as I will show 
they have deep methodological implications for evolutionary psychology.     
Evolutionary psychologists attempt to establish vertical homologies by way of two 
procedures.  One procedure begins by taking a target behavior and identifying its 
proximate psychological causes: being watchful of a mate might be identified by a 
psychological state whose content is something like “fearing that” or “believing that” 
oneʼs mate is cheating.  This is what non-evolutionary psychologists do as well: first 
identify a kind of behavior and then explain that behavior in terms of its proximate 
psychological causes.  Evolutionary psychologists go further.  They offer ultimate 
explanations of those proximate psychological causes by claiming that they have 
vertical homologs.29  The other procedure begins with a hypothesis about selection 
pressures that were encountered by our ancestors in the EEA.  In this case, 
evolutionary psychologists posit hard-wired, ancestral psychological adaptations.  They 
                                            
29 Because psychology can only be fitness-enhancing by producing fitness-enhancing 
behavioral effects, evolutionary psychologists must assume that ancestral psychology 
produced behaviors of the same sort as contemporary target behaviors.   
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then go on to propose that this (hypothesized) ancestral psychology is conserved, and 
therefore (strongly) vertically homologous with the psychology of contemporary human 
beings.  Key point: contemporary peoplesʼ psychology is assumed to be sensitive to the 
same sorts of inputs, and to produce similar sorts of behavioral outputs, as was the 
case for our ancestors. 
The integrity of this whole explanatory edifice depends on there being criteria for 
determining which ancestral psychological mechanisms and behaviors are strong 
vertical homologs of contemporary ones.  This issue has been ignored.  Instead, the 
evolutionary psychological enterprise is held together by a tacit assumption that indeed 
the needed identities have been established.  Of course, the fact that this 
methodological problem has not been addressed does not entail that it cannot be 
successfully addressed.  I will now consider what would be required of evolutionary 
psychologists in order to secure the inferences they make, and query whether these 
requirements can possibly be satisfied. 
For a contemporary trait to be a strong vertical homolog of an ancestral trait, the 
contemporary trait must be of the same kind as the ancestral one, it must have the 
same function as the ancestral one, and must be related by descent to that ancestral 
trait as part of a reproductive lineage extending back to the EEA. Furthermore, it must 
be the case that the target trait and the ancestral trait are of the same kind and have the 
same function because the target trait is descended from the ancestral trait.  In 
principle, it might be that a contemporary trait and an ancestral trait are of the same kind 
and have the same function without one being descended from the other.  But if this is 
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the case, then the contemporary trait is not a vertical homolog of the ancestral one, 
which would make it impossible to read off an ultimate explanation of the contemporary 
trait from the ancestral one.  This is why the fourth condition, specifying that the 
sameness relations must depend on descent, is central for evolutionary psychological 
explanations.  It follows from this demanding criterion that evolutionary psychological 
claims are unfounded unless its practitioners can show that mental modules 
underpinning present-day behaviors are in fact conserved structures that evolved in the 
EEA for the performance of adaptive tasks that it is still their function to perform.  There 
are two sorts of considerations that make this especially difficult.  The first is epistemic.  
Psychological mechanisms must be inferred from observations of behaviors.  So, 
knowledge of the mental modules possessed by contemporary humans can only be 
acquired by making inferences from the behaviors that the modules proximately cause, 
and knowledge of the modules that populated the minds of our prehistoric ancestors can 
only be gained by making inferences from the behaviors that they proximately caused.  
It is worth noting that some evolutionary psychologists would dispute this claim.  They 
argue that we can simply “read off” modules from the adaptive challenges that 
confronted our prehistoric ancestors (e.g., Buss 1995).  For example, if predator-
evasion was an adaptive challenge due to the existence of big cats that preyed on 
humans (as was certainly the case – see Quammen 2004) then natural selection must 
have seen to it that there was a predator-evasion module.  But this strategy cannot work 
because of what Sterelny and Griffiths (1999) call the “grain problem.”  Suppose that our 
prehistoric ancestors had modular minds, and that these modules were indeed 
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adaptations.  Question: was the module that enabled them to avoid being devoured by 
saber-toothed tigers a saber-toothed tiger avoidance module, a predator-avoidance 
module, or a danger-avoidance module?  As Sterelny and Griffiths perceptively remark, 
“It is not the existence of a single problem confronting the organism that explains the 
module, but [assumptions about] the existence of the module that explains why we think 
of mate choice as a single problem” (1999: 328–329).  
Inferring modules from behavior of prehistoric humans is a difficult task since we have 
only very general evidence of how early humans behaved (see, for example, Kaplan 
2002).  A more severe problem concerns the causal link between psychological 
mechanisms and the behaviors that they produce.  Evolutionary theory shows that the 
effects of biological causes may vary as a function of environmental contingencies.  
Because natural selection concerns the fitness enhancing traits of phenotypes, 
psychological structures can only be selected if they make a difference to reproductive 
success by producing behaviors that help spread copies of their genes in a certain sort 
of environment.  A structure operating outside the EEA might produce behaviors which 
promote fitness in ways that are very different from the ways that their prehistoric 
vertical homologs did, or may even undermine fitness.  They might also produce 
behaviors that differ significantly from the behaviors that they produced in the EEA.30  
Evolutionary psychologists must show that, notwithstanding the confounding effects of 
                                            
30 Evolutionary psychologists are often sensitive to this point (e.g., Crawford 1998).   
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environmental changes, present-day behaviors have their roots in ancestral homologs 
that had a positive effect on the fitness of humans in the EEA.   
Even if it were possible to establish that contemporary target behaviors are produced by 
evolved cognitive modules, there would still be obstacles to identifying these with 
particular kinds of behaviors and modules hypothesized to have existed in the EEA.  But 
this is precisely what is required for ultimate explanations of the sort given by 
evolutionary psychologists to succeed.  Modules can be individuated only by the 
behaviors that they produce, so their individuation is parasitic on the individuation of 
behaviors.  We ordinarily individuate behaviors by citing agentsʼ intentions (a behavior 
counts as answering the telephone if it was performed with the intention of answering 
the telephone).  Evolutionary psychologists cannot use this method for individuating 
behaviors, because they offer subpersonal explanations for the production of behavior, 
and do not address how, if at all, subpersonal explanations can be brought into relation 
to personal level explanations.31  Saying that a behavior is of a certain type in virtue of 
the intentions that produced it does not allow one to infer a subpersonal module 
responsible for the behavior (modules are subpersonal computational mechanisms, not 
rational agents with beliefs and desires).   
There are three options available for individuating behaviors.  One is to individuate them 
by their effects, another is to individuate them by their functions, and yet a third is to 
                                            
31 See Bermúdez (2005) for a thorough discussion of this problem. 
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individuate them by their causes.  I will address each of these and show that 
evolutionary psychologists cannot appeal to any of them.   
The first option is to individuate behaviors by their effects.  Evolutionary psychologists 
might claim that a contemporary target behavior is the same kind as an ancestral 
behavior only if both target and ancestral behaviors have the same kind of effects.  
Now, consider the claim that a target behavior is the same kind as a behavior in the 
EEA.  The first point to notice is that when one is dealing with claims about 
contemporary and ancestral behaviors there is always an epistemic asymmetry at work, 
since there is no way of observing what early humans did and what effects resulted from 
their doings.  Of course, paleoanthropologists can and do make inferences about 
prehistoric human behavior based on material culture and forensic evidence, but these 
inferences are far too coarse-grained to be of service to evolutionary psychologists.  
Consequently, they have to resort to speculations about what happened, which 
weakens the authority of their claims.  In most cases, it is not possible to determine the 
effects of prehistoric behaviors, but even if the epistemic obstacles can be surmounted, 
serious difficulties remain.  Suppose that two behaviors are tokens of the same type if 
they have effects of the same type.  The problem remains of establishing common 
causes for the two behaviors.  Suppose that an ancestral behavior and a contemporary 
behavior have the same kind of effect.  This would not license the inference that the 
psychological processes responsible for the target behavior were also responsible for 
the ancestral behavior.  So, individuating behaviors by their effects does not allow one 
to infer that contemporary target behaviors are underpinned by conserved modules. 
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The second option is to individuate behaviors by their functions.  By this criterion a 
target behavior is identical with an ancestral behavior if the two behaviors share the 
same function.  This approach has a strong intuitive appeal.  Hunting with stones and 
hunting with guns both count as hunting because both have the function of bringing 
down game.  This approach is not vulnerable to the difficulty of inferring modules from 
behaviors, but it suffers from a much deeper problem of circularity.  Individuating a 
target behavior by its function is the same as offering an ultimate explanation of that 
behavior.  But if one begins with the assumption that a target behavior has a function 
one has already presupposed that this very behavior was selected for in the EEA.  In 
other words, one supposes that a behavior was selected for and then uses this 
supposition as evidence that the behavior was selected for.  A further problem with this 
strategy is that evolutionary psychologists hold that it is psychological mechanisms 
rather than behaviors that are selected-for.  Behaviors have selected functions only 
derivatively, as expressions of modules that were under selection in the EEA.  So the 
claim that some behavior has a certain function rests on the assumption that the 
behavior is produced by a module that was selected for performing this function.  This 
brings us back to the original problem of making inferences from behaviors to modules. 
Although the function of a phenotypic trait is seen in the effects that it produces, 
individuating behaviors by their functions does not collapse into individuating them by 
their effects.  The function of a phenotypic trait is the effect of that trait on fitness in a 
critical mass of cases in the EEA.  In any particular case, tokens of the trait might fail to 
produce the fitness-enhancing effect.  Consider two birds of the same species, both of 
 72 
which perform courtship displays.  One birdʼs display has the effect of attracting a mate, 
but the otherʼs does not.  If what makes the two behaviors fall under the category 
“courtship display” is their function, it is clear that effects of a behavior need not always 
accord with its function.  In this case two different effects are produced and it is not clear 
if only one or both is a selected function   
Finally, one might individuate behaviors by their causes.  This seems to be the only 
option evolutionary psychologists, because they need to be able to infer underlying 
psychology from behavioral effects in order to give ultimate explanations of present-day 
psychology.  On this option, if two behaviors have the same (proximate) psychological 
causes then they belong to the same behavioral kind.  Now, consider the claim that a 
target behavior is the same kind as a behavior in the EEA.  If behaviors are individuated 
by their causes, then the contemporary target behavior that one wishes to explain, and 
the behavior in the EEA by means of which one wishes to explain it, must have the 
same kind of causes.  This strategy too is circular because it is proposed that cognitive 
modules can only be individuated by the behaviors that they bring about, and it is also 
proposed that these behaviors are individuated by the modules that cause them.   
I have already pointed out that if an organism is still in the EEA, or is in an environment 
that is relevantly similar to the EEA, one can offer real ultimate explanations of its 
behavior and psychology. The reason has to do with the relationship between genetic 
developmental programs and the environments in which the programs operate.  Very 
often, environments are implicitly regarded as causally inefficacious backgrounds to 
development (West-Eberhard 2003), but this is misleading, because even subtle 
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environmental variations can lead to striking phenotypic differences.  For example, 
water fleas (Daphnia cucullata) that develop in an environment where there are 
chemicals indicating the presence of predators, undergo dramatic morphological 
changes.  They develop impressive, helmet-like structures on their necks and spines 
along their tails.  These are epigenetic effects that persist across generations (Tolliran 
and Dodson 1999, Agrawell, Laforsch, and Tolliran 1999), and there are no such effects 
in environments in which these chemicals are absent.  Environmentally-induced 
developmental changes affecting behavior have been observed in a variety of species.  
For example, infant Bonnet macaques that are raised in conditions where the efforts 
required for forging food are highly variable (sometimes requiring extensive foraging and 
sometimes not) are strikingly more timid than those raised in conditions where efforts 
required for forging are more consistent (conditions in which the macaques either do not 
ever have to forage extensively or always have to forage extensively).  The infants 
raised in environments with variable foraging demands also show signs of depression of 
the sort normally observed only in maternally deprived primates, and as adolescents 
they are less inclined to engage in social play behavior.  Recent studies demonstrate 
that the inconsistent form of provisioning alters the development of the monkeysʼ neural 
systems that mediate responses to stress (Copland et al. 1996, 1998). 
One reason for the widespread neglect of the causal significance of environments for 
development may have to do with the tacit assumption that environments have not 
changed in important ways since the EEA.  This assumption licenses unwarranted 
claims about selection.  When we say that some feature of an organism was selected 
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for, this is really a shorthand expression for a complex causal story involving genetics, 
developmental pathways, and chemical signaling systems, the result of all of which is 
differential fitness relative to an environment.  All of these processes are sensitive to 
environmental contingencies.  The environment-relative nature of the processes 
responsible for producing phenotypes is such that even if the very same causal 
mechanisms underpin the behavior of an ancestral individual and a present-day 
individual, these might produce divergent behavioral effects.  For this reason (as well as 
others), one cannot simply infer sameness of psychological causes from sameness of 
behavioral effects.  Even if a contemporary target behavior is the output of a mental 
module, it does not follow that the same module would have produced the same 
behavior it produced in the EEA.  The causal role of environments weakens the 
explanatory glue between evolved psychological mechanisms and their behavioral 
effects, and casts doubt on the claim that if a certain behavior is reliably produced by a 
certain causal mechanism in a present-day environment that is far removed from the 
circumstances in which our prehistoric ancestors lived, then the presence of that same 
behavior (however individuated) permits one to infer that the behavior stemmed from 
the same cause in the EEA.  
One might deal with this problem by “black boxing” the causes of ancestral behaviors 
and saying something like “selection resulted in developmental processes that gave rise 
to such–and-such behaviors” while remaining agnostic about the nature of these 
developmental processes.  Clearly, early humans did have adaptive behavioral 
phenotypes and there were developmental processes at work that brought these into 
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being.  However, this black-boxing strategy is not available to evolutionary 
psychologists, because they regard their project as one of discovering the deep 
structure of the mind and thereby giving ultimate explanations of present-day 
psychology.  Tooby and Cosmides put this very clearly, writing that, thanks to 
evolutionary psychological research, “in 50 or 100 years one will be able to pick up an 
equivalent reference work [to Grayʼs Anatomy] for psychology and find in it detailed 
information-processing descriptions of the multitude of evolved species-typical 
adaptations of the human mindʼʼ (1992: 69). 
For organisms that are still in the EEA, one can infer that the developmental factors 
have remained more or less the same since the time when they were initially selected.  
In such cases, the proximate causes of a contemporary target behavior can reasonably 
be thought to coincide with the proximate causes of that behavior earlier in the lineage.  
Because the environment has remained constant in these cases, it is possible to “read 
back” the underlying causal processes to say something about their nature in ancestral 
populations.32  However, ultimate explanations of human behaviors are not normally of 
this sort, as many aspects of our environments have changed in significant ways since 
the EEA.  There are special limitations that apply in such cases.  One cannot justifiably 
“read back” the proximate causes of the behavior into the EEA because changes in the 
                                            
32 Even in these cases the inference will be unreliable if, at some point in the past, the 
population has encountered a bottleneck.  If a population undergoes a drastic collapse, 
it may be that the genetic profile of the pre-bottleneck population differs significantly 
from the post-bottleneck population, and consequently that the causal underpinnings of 
phenotypic traits differ as well (Richard Boyd, personal communication).   
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environment may have altered the behavioral effects of proximate psychological causes.  
So it looks like knowing that a certain contemporary target behavior is caused by some 
proximate psychological process does not allow one to assume that this process was 
selected for in the EEA as the cause of some corresponding ancestral behavior.  One 
cannot establish that a contemporary target behavior is caused in the same way as a 
similar ancestral behavior because we have no access to the psychological causes of 
the ancestral behavior (as we have seen, evolutionary psychologists cannot rely on 
individuating behaviors by their causes).   
What emerges from all of this is that ultimate explanations of human behaviors in the 
EEA may shed no light on contemporary target behaviors.  If ancestral psychology has 
been conserved since the Pleistocene, it might have manifestations in contemporary 
behaviors that are quite different from those that the same psychology produced in 
ancestral environments.  The key worry in trying to individuate behaviors by their causes 
in the context of ultimate explanations concerns the order of explanation.  To say of any 
two behaviors that they are the same because they have causes of the same kind, one 
first has to establish that the psychological processes that cause the behaviors are the 
same.  It is only after this has been established that one can conclude that the two 
behaviors are the same.  But this forecloses the possibility of inferring the psychological 
cause of a prehistoric behavior from the psychological cause of a current behavior, as 
evolutionary psychologists try to do.   
The preceding discussion has shown that even if it were possible to know that a 
contemporary target behavior is produced by a module that is strongly vertically 
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homologous to some module that was selected for during the EEA, there is no way to 
infer which ancestral module is homologous with the contemporary one.  This shows 
that ultimate explanations of the sort that are offered by evolutionary psychologists are 
not scientifically viable. 
6.  What is conserved?  
The considerations that I have presented prompt thoughts on the uses of the notion of 
“conservation” as applied to behavior.  Genes, anatomical structures, physiological 
processes, and behaviors are said to be conserved if they persist in a lineage and 
“highly conserved” if they persist in a lineage despite speciation.  Suppose that it is true 
that that there is some sense in which human psychology has been conserved since the 
Pleistocene or before.  This might be understood as a claim that the causal mechanisms 
that gave rise to a behavior in the EEA have been conserved without the behavior that 
they produced in the EEA having been conserved.  Alternatively, it might be meant as a 
claim that behaviors prevalent in the EEA have been conserved without their causal 
mechanisms having been conserved.  Or it might be meant as a claim that both causal 
mechanisms and behaviors have been conserved.  To say that a behavior has been 
conserved is only to say that a target behavior is “the same” as some ancestral behavior 
by some criterion or other.  This weak sense of “conservation” cannot support 
evolutionary psychological claims because it says nothing about the underlying 
psychology.  So, in order for their project to go through, evolutionary psychologists must 
assert that the causal mechanisms underpinning the target behavior have been 
conserved.   To justify this, they need an individuation criterion that allows them to infer 
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sameness of psychological cause from sameness of behavioral effects, both now and in 
the EEA.  In other words, the pattern of reasoning that would allow one to offer ultimate 
explanations for the psychological causes of target behaviors depends on both 
psychological causes and behavioral effects being conserved.  
7.  An example of evolutionary psychology in action 
I turn now to an example of what is known as the bottom-up strategy (Buss 2004) to 
illustrate how evolutionary psychology falls foul of the individuation problem.  I will show 
how this leads practitioners to offer allegedly ultimate explanations of contemporary 
target behaviors in place of genuine ones.  It is important to emphasize that this is not a 
cherry-picked example.  The methodological deficits that it so clearly illustrates are 
rampant in the evolutionary psychological literature.  I have selected the example 
because it displays these deficits especially clearly.   
The study, entitled “Sex differences in perceptions of infidelity: men often assume the 
worst” (Goetz & Causey 2009) appeared in Evolutionary Psychology, a well-regarded 
peer-reviewed electronic journal.   
The authors begin with a claim about conditions obtaining in the EEA.  Drawing on 
Triversʼ (1972) Parental Investment Theory, they state that it would have been more 
biologically costly for men than for women to fail to detect a partnerʼs infidelity.   
Ancestral men…were susceptible to an additional and profound cost if they failed 
to detect a partnerʼs infidelity: cuckoldry—the unwitting investment of resources 
into genetically unrelated offspring.  Cuckoldry was one of the most serious 
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threats to fitness our male ancestors faced.  Some of the costs associated with 
cuckoldry include misdirection of the male's time, effort, and recourses to rearing 
a rival's offspring, loss of time, effort, and resources the man spent attracting his 
partner, and reputational damage if such information becomes known to others 
(255) 
The claims made here about the social and sexual behavior of prehistoric humans far 
exceed anything warranted by paleoanthropological evidence.  But we can ignore this 
shortcoming because even if these claims were well founded, the inference made from 
them would still be unwarranted.  Suppose that these claims about early humans are 
true.  The authors infer that they “provided selection pressure for an arsenal of anti-
cuckoldry tactics in men” and that one of these may have been “evolved psychological 
mechanisms designed to overperceive the likelihood of their partnerʼs infidelity.”  On the 
assumption that a mateʼs sexual infidelity was more costly for ancestral men than it was 
for ancestral women, the authors infer that contemporary men should be more 
suspicious of their partnerʼs future infidelity than contemporary women are.    
Due to the costs associated with being cuckolded, menʼs infidelity detection 
system may have been designed to overestimate the likelihood of their partnerʼs 
future infidelity. This overestimation bias would have generated behavior aimed 
at preventing infidelity, such as increased vigilance, mate guarding, and even 
affectionate behavior (258). 
The study proceeded as follows.  One hundred sixty-three male and female college 
students were asked (1) “How likely do you think it is that you will in the future have 
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sexual intercourse with someone other than your current partner?” and (2) “Please 
indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statement: ʻI will probably be 
sexually unfaithful to my partner.ʼ” They were also asked (3) “How likely do you think it is 
that your current partner will in the future have sexual intercourse with someone other 
than you, while in a relationship with you?” and (4) “Please indicate your agreement or 
disagreement with the following statement: ʻMy partner will probably be sexually 
unfaithful to me in the future.ʼ”  
Using two independent samples, two different response formats, and two data 
collection methods, we found support for our hypothesis.  Menʼs perceptions of 
the likelihood of their partnerʼs future infidelities were greater than womenʼs.  In 
conclusion, we found support for the hypothesis that menʼs infidelity detection 
system should be designed to overestimate the likelihood of their partnerʼs 
infidelity (262).  
Now, consider the inferential structure of this study.  The authors begin with a theory-
driven conjecture that in the EEA mate infidelity was more costly for males than it was 
for females, and that those males who were good at safeguarding against their matesʼ 
infidelity would have been more fit than those who were not able to guard against it as 
effectively.  They infer from this that selection favored a tendency for males to be more 
suspicious of their mates than females are, and that this explains hypothesized mate 
guarding behavior in the EEA.  These ancestral target behaviors (increased vigilance, 
mate guarding, and even affectionate behavior) are then ultimately explained as having 
the function of preventing their mates from clandestinely conceiving offspring with other 
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men in virtue of having been underwritten by selected-for cognitive mechanisms 
(responsible for the tendency to “overperceive” infidelity).  Finally, the responses to the 
investigatorsʼ questions about partnersʼ future infidelity are the contemporary target 
behavior.  This behavior is assumed to be a strong vertical homolog of the ancestral 
target behavior, and therefore being amenable to the same ultimate explanation.   
Confronted with evidence that 21st century male American college students33 are more 
doubtful of the future sexual fidelity of their mates than their female counterparts are, the 
authors assume that (a) male college studentsʼ expressed skepticism is caused by a 
hardwired, domain-specific cognitive module, and (b) that the same module existed in 
Pleistocene males, and that it produced behaviors of the same sort as the contemporary 
behavior.  These unsound assumptions are supposed to underwrite the conclusion that 
the sexual suspiciousness of contemporary males is caused by an innate cognitive 
mechanism with the evolutionary function of enhancing their fitness by preventing 
cuckoldry.  But the authors do not provide support for their claim that the psychological 
mechanism driving contemporary male sexual skepticism is the very same mechanism 
that (supposedly) drove prehistoric anti-cuckoldry behavior.  In light of the arguments 
that I have presented, it is not possible to provide such support.  Consequently, the 
authorsʼ inferences about the evolutionary roots of the male students attitudes – their 
                                            
33 The tendency by psychologists to ignore the remarkable degree to which culture 
influences psychology, and to draw sweeping conclusions about human beings on the 
basis of samples drawn from Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic 
societies is powerfully argued by Henrich et al. (2010). 
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allegedly ultimate explanation of it – is unjustified.   It might be true, but we have not 
been given good reasons to accept it as true.  Additionally, the authors help themselves 
to assumptions about the computational structure of the ancestral module – namely, 
that it produced skepticism about the fidelity of mates.  This claim is not entailed by the 
hypothesis that there was selection in the EEA for a module with the function of 
guarding against female infidelity.  Even if there were good evidence that the sexual 
skepticism of contemporary males is underwritten by a domain-specific module, this 
would fall short of showing that it is plausible that the contemporary module is a strong 
vertical homolog of an ancestral module with the function of preventing infidelity. 
8. Conclusion 
Evolutionary psychologistsʼ claims about ancestral modules are formulated on 
theoretical grounds.  They suppose that recurring adaptive challenges were likely to 
give rise to mental adaptations in the EEA, and then suppose that these modules 
underpin contemporary behavior.  Suppose that one could establish, on these sorts of 
theoretical grounds, that the minds of our Pleistocene ancestors possessed a module 
that was responsible for a certain sort of domain-specific behavior.  For example, 
suppose that one could establish that ancestral females possessed a “mate-selection 
module” — a mental system that was sensitive to whatever attributes of potential mates 
were correlated (in the EEA) with reproductive value, and which regulated mating 
behaviors performed by these females.  Now, what conclusions about the mate-
selection module would this claim license?  Nothing other than that there was a module 
dedicated to regulating female mating behavior in the EEA.  On its own, it would not 
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license conclusions about the inputs to which the module was tuned, nor would it 
license conclusions about the behaviors that it brought about.  Given that the 
evolutionary hypothesis does not provide any specific information about the 
computational structure of the ancestral module, we cannot extrapolate from it to draw 
conclusions about the psychological mechanisms that regulate the mating behavior of 
contemporary women.  Even if one knew that the mating behavior of contemporary 
women is regulated by a conserved module, the evolutionary hypothesis would not 
underwrite the inference that this module is the same one that regulated the mating 
behavior of ancestral females.  All of this prompts the question, “is evolutionary 
psychology possible?”   
David Buller (2005) thinks that it is possible to give contentful explanations of human 
behavior situated in the context of evolutionary theory.  He distinguishes evolutionary 
psychology from what he calls Evolutionary Psychology.   
The former is a field of inquiry, a loose confederation of research programs that 
vary widely in theoretical and methodological commitments and that are 
federated only by a commitment to ʻʻadopting an evolutionary perspective on 
human behavior and psychologyʼʼ (Barrett et al. 2002: 1). The latter, Evolutionary 
Psychology, is a specific doctrinaire research program within this field of inquiry, 
a central doctrine of which is the so-called massive modularity hypothesis (MMH) 
(881). 
If the arguments presented in this paper succeed, the methodological defects of 
Evolutionary Psychology (as opposed to evolutionary psychology) are so severe as to 
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be unrectifiable, and consequently Evolutionary Psychology is not viable.  Evolutionary 
Psychologists simply do not have the methodological resources to justify the claim that 
the psychological causes of contemporary behaviors are strong vertical homologs of the 
psychological causes of corresponding behaviors in the EEA.  The verdict for 
evolutionary psychology (as opposed to Evolutionary Psychology) is less clear.  It 
should go without saying that the human mind is a product of evolution, and evolution 
must therefore enter into an explanation of human psychology in some way.  
Evolutionary Psychology rests on three pillars: the massive modularity hypothesis, the 
claim that modules evolved as adaptations to recurrent challenges in the EEA, and the 
tacit assumption that modules can be individuated and so license claims about strong 
vertical homologies.  These three components, taken together, are inconsistent with the 
competing evolutionary hypothesis that evolution fashioned the human mind as a 
domain-general or modestly modular learning system.  On this account, the architecture 
of the human mind (whatever that turns out to be) was selected to be adaptive and 
malleable, rather than fixed and instinct-like, and supports a view of “human nature” that 
is far less reductive and nativist than the version that is promulgated by Evolutionary 
Psychologists (as well as sociobiologists and other social scientists influenced by 
evolutionary thinking).  Importantly, this competing hypothesis is immune from the 
criticisms that I have developed in this paper, chiefly because it does not reduce the 
mind to an array of domain-specific systems and require that these are homologs of 
ancestral systems.  It is also well-supported by recent work in developmental biology 
indicating that it is often the case that the behavioral repertoire of even invertebrates is 
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often highly malleable and driven by learning (West-Eberhart 2003, Menzel & Benjamin 
2013).  However, a research program of this sort – one which restricts itself to 
scientifically justifiable claims about the phylogenetic roots of human psychology, and 
which gives developmental plasticity and learning their due – is unlikely to have much 
utility for explaining the specifics of human behavior biologically.  It is likely to be less 
contentful than Evolutionary Psychology precisely because it makes no attempt to 
extend biological explanations to domains where they are not of service. 
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CHAPTER 3 
So Many Ways to be Wrong about Evolution: 
The Strange Case of Joyceʼs Evolutionary Debunking Argument 
 
1. Introduction 
A number of accounts have been put forth in support of the view that morality evolved 
(e.g., Gibbard 1992, Katz 2000, Sinnott-Armstrong 2007, Fleming & Levinson 2012).  
Proponents of such accounts utilize evolutionary theory to make substantive claims 
about the origin and, most importantly, the functions of morality.  For some, the 
evolution of morality has implications for metaethics (e.g., Richards 1986, Campbell 
1996, Casebeer 2003, Street 2006).  In this Chapter I am going to discuss Richard 
Joyceʼs foray into the evolution of morality, as set out in his book of the same name 
(2006).  Joyce offers a rich account of what he believes the evolution of morality to have 
consisted in, and argues that this evolutionary story undermines moral realism.  The 
standard use of evolutionary theory, both in biology and in the social sciences, is to 
account for the origin and function of phenotypic features.  Joyce uses it to give an 
account of the origin and function of moral judgment, but he also uses evolutionary 
theory to craft a skeptical argument to the effect that moral beliefs are never 
epistemically justified, and therefore that moral realism is probably false.   
Joyceʼs argument is an example of what have come to be called “evolutionary 
debunking arguments” (Kahane 2011).  These are arguments that purport to show that 
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the evolutionary genealogy of certain sorts of belief (typically, evaluative beliefs) 
undermines the likelihood of their being true, but which are structured in a way that 
avoids the genetic fallacy.  There are two parts to such arguments.  The first part is 
empirical.  It consists of descriptive premises which lead to the conclusion that a certain 
sort of belief has an evolutionary etiology.  The second part is epistemic.  It involves 
premises which lead to the conclusion that the etiological account gives one reason not 
to be confident in the truth of beliefs of that kind.  The general form of such arguments, 
then, can be captured in the following formula: if such-and-such an evolutionary 
explanation of a class of beliefs is true, then this shows that the beliefs under 
consideration are unjustified.  The evolutionary facts about the etiology of the beliefs are 
said to exclude the possibility that they are justified.  The idea is this: there is an inverse 
relation between the strength (plausibility) of the evolutionary story and the degree to 
which one should have confident in the beliefs that it purports to explain.   
 On the face of it, then, such arguments will be philosophically significant only to the 
degree that the empirical claims on which their skeptical conclusions are founded are 
likely to be true.  I say “on the face of it” because I will later show that the resources of 
evolutionary theory are insufficient to warrant Joyceʼs conclusion, and that he must in 
the end invoke conceptual issues.  
Joyceʼs account of how morality evolved leans heavily on evolutionary psychology, both 
in form and in substance.  Like his fellow debunker Sharon Street (2006) he holds that 
evolutionary psychology has substantive implications for philosophy.  He believes that 
evolutionary psychological explanations can rule out certain philosophical positions and 
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underwrite others.  As I have articulated in Chapter Two of this dissertation, evolutionary 
psychology is methodologically flawed.  Consequently, Joyceʼs use of it is riddled with 
difficulties.  In the course of my discussion, I will concentrate on three of difficulties that 
his argument encounters.  These are summarized as follows.  I argued in Chapter Two 
that evolutionary psychological inferences do not address the problem of establishing 
that present-day psychological mechanisms are function-preserving reproductions of 
ancestral psychological mechanisms.  In the present chapter I will show that this worry 
applies in equal measure to Joyceʼs use of evolutionary psychology.  I will argue that he 
has not established – or come anywhere near to establishing – that the proximate moral 
psychology of contemporary human beings is the very same moral psychology that was 
selected for in the EEA.  His failure to secure this identity undermines the credibility of 
the empirical portion of his argument and therefore, by extension, the credibility of the 
metaethical conclusion of the argument as a whole.  My second concern also pertains to 
the empirical portion of his argument.  I will show that although Joyce claims that his 
evolutionary speculations are supported empirically, his justificatory strategy is flawed. I 
argue that he demonstrates only that his evolutionary story is consistent with certain 
data.  Consistency is important, because a claim that is not consistent with the relevant 
data is likely to be false.  But mere consistency is not enough.  For oneʼs claim to be 
empirically supported it must be more plausible than rival claims that are also consistent 
with the data.  Joyce fails to deliver on this requirement.  My third criticism concerns the 
inference from the empirical portion of the argument to its metaethical conclusion.  I will 
demonstrate that Joyceʼs metaethical conclusion does not follow from his empirical 
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premises.  Even if all of Joyceʼs empirical considerations are sound, the metaethical 
lesson that he draws from them is unjustified unless he introduces an additional, highly 
implausible premise.  Along the way I will touch upon other weaknesses in a more 
perfunctory manner. 
The organization of the chapter is as follows.  In Section Two, I will set out Joyceʼs 
account of the evolution of the moral sense.  To do this, I will explain his view of what it 
is that distinguished proto-moral attitudes from true moral judgment, and then set out his 
thesis that both were selected for in the EEA because of their reproductive benefits.  In 
Section Three, I will explore the grounds for Joyceʼs choice of just this evolutionary 
hypothesis.  I will show that, like all such accounts, it rests on questionable assumptions 
about the conservation of psychological phenotypes.  I will then argue that the empirical 
considerations that he cites do not provide significant support for his evolutionary 
hypothesis.  In Section Four I will explain Joyceʼs argument in support of the metaethical 
entailments of his evolutionary story, and then, in Section Five, I will show why, even if 
the empirical portion of the argument is sound, his metaethical conclusions are 
unwarranted. 
2.  Joyceʼs evolutionary hypothesis 
The claim that morality evolved is ambiguous.  It might mean that we Homo sapiens are 
disposed to be kind, generous, cooperative, intolerant of injustice, and so on, because 
evolution shaped us to behave in these ways.  Notice that this does not entail anything 
about the nature of the psychological mechanisms that are responsible for these 
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dispositions.  Alternatively, the claim that morality evolved might be a claim about moral 
psychology.  For Joyce, being a moral animal is not just a matter of how one behaves; it 
is a matter of why one behaves that way.  Moral behavior is behavior that is, at least in 
part, motivated by moral judgments.  Joyce holds that the capacity for moral judgment 
proceeds from a psychological faculty which he calls the moral sense.   
Inclinations to be helpful and aversions to being harmful are not in themselves moral.  
They are the pre-moral “building blocks” (de Waal 2009) of morality.  It is generally 
accepted that prosocial behaviors were selected for in social species (e.g., Wilson 1975, 
Axelrod & Hamilton 1981, Maynard Smith 1982), because cooperation enhances 
genetic fitness.  However, on Joyceʼs account, instinctive prosociality was not sufficient 
for securing cooperation among early humans.  Human beings evolved cognitive 
capacities that endowed them with tremendous behavioral flexibility.  Thanks to our 
capacity for instrumental reasoning, we are able to choose courses of action that benefit 
us as individuals to the detriment of the fitness of our genes.  Consequently, the innate 
prosocial dispositions of early human beings could be trumped by self-interested 
motives.  Our ancestorsʼ flexible psychology made them fickle.  Given the fitness 
benefits of cooperation and the power of self-interest to undermine it, there was (Joyce 
speculates) selection pressure for the emergence of a psychological faculty for 
safeguarding prosocial behavior.  This is how the moral sense came into being. 
The moral sense has several distinctive features.  One of them is domain specificity.  
The moral sense is attuned to the social sphere.  It is “a specialized mechanism 
functioning to govern an adaptive behavior” (114).  Thus, the moral sense is very like, if 
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not identical to, what evolutionary psychologists call a “cognitive module” (see Chapter 
Two).  A second important feature of the moral sense is that it operates with 
linguistically-infused concepts such as “desert” and “transgression,” which are required 
for distinctively moral attitudes such as guilt and blame.  This implies that language had 
to have become established before morality could evolve, and given that morality 
involves sophisticated concepts, hominin language abilities would have had to have 
been correspondingly sophisticated for this to happen.34  Third, it is central to Joyceʼs 
conception that moral judgments have practical clout.  They have practical clout 
because of their perceived authority and inescapability.  The authority of a moral 
judgment is its binding force.  Moral judgments are felt to take precedence over 
prudential or hedonic considerations that conflict with them.  The inescapability of moral 
judgments is driven by the fact that they are represented not as subjective evaluations 
of the world, but as objective properties of it.  From a subjective perspective, it is not just 
that one morally disapproves of x.  Rather, it is that one disapproves of x because x has 
the property of moral badness.  It is the practical clout of moral judgments that put 
pressure on our prehistoric ancestors to conform to and enforce norms of cooperation.  
And the claim is that it exerts the same kind of pressure on the behavior of modern 
human beings. Consequently, “Moral judgment can thus function as a kind of social 
                                            
34 There is a great deal of scientific controversy about when it was that language 
emerged (Christiansen & Kirby 2004).  If language emerged fairly recently, this may 
falsify Joyceʼs hypothesis about the moral sense, because a special-purpose, 
biologically unprecedented cognitive module would have taken quite a long time to 
evolve. 
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glue, bonding individuals together in a shared justificatory structure and providing a tool 
for solving many group coordination problems” (Joyce 2006: 117). 
3.  The proximate mechanism 
Joyceʼs empirical hypothesis is that moral judgments are outputs of a domain-specific 
cognitive mechanism that was selected for stabilizing prosocial behavior by buffering it 
against the effects of self-interested motives.  Now, it is a truism that proximate 
mechanisms are underdetermined by selection pressures.  That is, for any set of 
selection pressures, there are a number of proximate mechanisms that might serve as 
candidates for responding to those pressures.  Perhaps an example will make this clear.  
Animals that rely extensively on vision are vulnerable to predation at night, because it is 
difficult for them to detect, and therefore to evade, animals that prey on them.  Among 
nocturnal animals, those individuals that are able to detect the presence of predators in 
conditions of poor illumination (all things being equal) have greater reproductive 
success than those that are unable to do this.  For nocturnal animals living in ecologies 
where nocturnal predators are abundant, there is a selection pressure for traits that 
protect them from nocturnal predation.  That is to say, under these circumstances, 
animals best able to avoid nocturnal predation will leave more descendants than their 
less well-endowed conspecifics.  How might selection operate in such circumstances?   
There are a number of possibilities.  There might be selection for more acute night 
vision, or for enhanced auditory abilities, or for the ability to sense the heat of a nearby 
predatorʼs body, or for an odor that repels predators, or for greater locomotor speed, or 
for silent locomotion, or for any number of other phenotypic variations.  This example 
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makes clear that knowing that certain selection pressures obtained in the EEA does not 
license inferences about which proximate mechanisms were selected for responding to 
those pressures.   
Suppose that Joyceʼs hypothesis that there was a selection pressure for stabilizing 
prosocial dispositions is true.  Evolution might have settled upon any of a number of 
“solutions” to this problem.  If there was some adaptive response to these selection 
pressures, all that one needs to assume is that there was selection for some proximate 
mechanism that stabilized prosocial attitudes (Boyd unpublished manuscript).  Why 
should one suppose that Joyce has identified the proximate mechanism that was in fact 
selected for?   That is, why should one think that Joyceʼs hypothesis is more plausible 
than its projectable alternatives?   Why not suppose that there was selection for 
stronger prosocial emotions or greater indoctrinability instead of selection for a moral 
sense?   Joyce is not entirely unaware of the problem, but he misconstrues it in a way 
that underestimates its force for his project.  This is clearly shown by his response to 
David Lahtiʼs criticism.  Lahti (2003) pointed out that it seems odd that natural selection 
would create a biologically novel mechanism for regulating cooperative behavior instead 
of strengthening prehistoric humansʼ desire to cooperate.  Joyceʼs reply turns on an 
analogy with other proximate mechanisms. 
Think…about the psychological reward systems that have evolved in humans 
regarding sex and eating.  One might ask why natural selection bothered giving 
us all that complicated physiological equipment needed for having an orgasm – 
why not design us simply to want to have sex?  Natural selection did make us 
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want to have sex, and one of the means of securing this desire was precisely the 
human orgasm….And perhaps natural selection has made us want to cooperate, 
and granting us a tendency to think of cooperation in moral terms (where this 
includes the capacity for guilt) is a means of securing this desire (114-115). 
This response misses the point of Lahtiʼs criticism entirely.  The point at issue is not 
whether the moral sense is a desire-strengthening faculty.  Lahtiʼs point concerns the 
grounds for supposing that evolutionary processes gave rise to an entirely new faculty 
rather than modifying an existing one.  Lahtiʼs worry is grounded in a heuristic that 
biologists use to decide among alternative hypotheses.  He is invoking the principle that 
evolution “tinkers” with existing structures.  Over time, the cumulative effects of many 
such changes add up to major phenotypic modifications.  Lahtiʼs point is that taking into 
account the gradualistic character of natural selection allows one to limit the “possibility 
space” of candidate proximate mechanisms. 
Now, returning to the question of Joyceʼs motivation for settling on this particular 
proximate mechanism, one might suggest that it was guided by his antirealist 
commitments.  I think a more likely explanation is that he has lost sight of the 
methodological importance of entertaining projectable alternatives when offering 
empirical explanations (as is often the case in evolutionary psychological accounts).  
Recall that Joyce is trying to give an explanation of a feature of contemporary moral 
psychology – namely, the capacity for moral judgment.  He is not just extrapolating from 
an evolutionary scenario.  Instead, he has a contemporary explanatory target in mind 
from which he infers an evolutionary etiology.  Suppose that one grants that Joyce is 
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correct in saying that contemporary people experience moral judgment as authoritative, 
inescapable, and as involving the existence of objective moral facts (this seems more 
than just plausible).  Further, suppose that the function of this faculty (the moral sense) 
in contemporary humans is for stabilizing prosocial dispositions (again, a very plausible 
assumption).  Now, what do these facts imply?  On Joyceʼs view these facts are best 
explained by the assumption that the moral sense evolved and that it was conserved 
along with its ancestral function.  But why think that an evolutionary story is the best 
explanation of the moral sense in contemporary people?  To justify his evolutionary turn, 
Joyce must show that it is implausible that the moral sense was acquired by means of 
social learning, and he attempts to do this in the following way.  He holds that if the 
moral sense was selected for then it must be innate.  This entails that if the moral sense 
is not innate, then it was not selected for.  If one accepts this, then the reasonable thing 
to do is to evaluate the relevant scientific literature to determine whether the evidence 
favors a nativist account of moral judgment.  Joyce derives five major points from this 
literature in favor of moral nativism.  These include the universality of morality among 
humans, the broad similarity of moral norms across far-flung cultures, childrenʼs 
development of morality in the absence of explicit instruction, childrenʼs ability to 
distinguish moral norms from conventional norms, and childrenʼs facility handling 
deontic rules.  Joyce concedes that none of these considerations decisively support 
nativism, but he argues that they count in favor of it.35  Here, Joyce is using the same 
                                            
35 Yet another methodological problem is that Joyce does not undertake a comparable 
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top-down explanatory strategy that is often adopted by evolutionary psychologists:  first 
identify a contemporary psychological or behavioral trait, next argue that it is innate, and 
finally propose an evolutionary scenario that would explain why the trait is (innately) 
present in contemporary humans. 
4.  Two problems with Joyceʼs empirical argument 
Nowhere are the methodological shortcomings of Joyceʼs approach more obvious than 
in his attempt to neutralize the charge that his evolutionary account is nothing more than 
a just-so story.  Gould and Lewontin (1979) introduced the term “just-so story” to ridicule 
speculative adaptationist accounts of human behavior that were at the time rampant in 
the sociobiological literature.  They were however not very clear about exactly what 
qualifies an evolutionary hypothesis as a just-so story.  As I understand it, just-so stories 
are adaptationist hypotheses about contemporary traits that meet only the lowest 
standard of scientific justification: they are possibly true explanations.  An explanation is 
possibly true just in case it is consistent with whatever it is supposed to explain.  Now, 
for anything that one wishes to explain there is an indefinitely large pool of possibly 
explanations, not all of which will be plausible.  Among the plausible ones, some will be 
more plausible than others (on grounds such as parsimony, consistency with well-
confirmed hypotheses, successful predictions entailed by it, etc.).  The plausibility of an 
                                                                                                                                             
survey of empirical evidence supporting an anti-nativist account.  This makes it 
impossible for the reader to form an evaluation of the strength of the evidence in favor of 
nativism.  For anti-nativist interpretations of the evidence presented by Joyce, see Prinz 
(2008). 
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explanation, relative to other possible explanations, is roughly its degree of empirical 
support.  So, a just-so story is an evolutionary explanation that is consistent with the 
phenomenon to be explained but which is no more plausible than other possible 
candidates.  Now, consider Joyceʼs defense of his position in light of these distinctions.  
He writes, “I am not putting this hypothesis forward as true.  It is a hypothesis that is 
plausible, coherent, and testable – and its truth remains to be established.  However, 
there is good reason for looking favorably upon it” (134).  If there is good (empirical) 
reason for looking favorably upon a hypothesis it is, by my lights, a plausible hypothesis.  
So, Joyce seems to be using “plausible” in much the same way as I intend it.  And if his 
hypothesis is plausible (in this sense) then it is not a just-so story.  So, to evaluate 
Joyceʼs defense, it is necessary to consider how and to what degree it is supported by 
empirical considerations.  I have already noted that the hypothesis is consistent with a 
range of empirical evidence, so it is possibly true.  What is needed now is something 
stronger, something that indicates that the hypothesis is preferable, on empirical 
grounds, to other possibly true explanations.  But Joyce does not supply any such 
evidence.  Instead, he seems to think that evidence in favor of moral nativism is 
sufficient to establish the plausibility of his theory.  So the theory remains vulnerable to 
the accusation that it is a just-so story.  There is nothing in his account that should lead 
one to prefer it to rival explanations of moral nativism (recall that insufficient evidence 
has been given to warrant moral nativism over moral non-nativism – see footnote 2). 
There is also a deeper problem handicapping Joyceʼs argument.  The problem is this.  
Joyce wishes to bring two things together under the umbrella of a unified explanation.  
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One is a set of selection pressures in the EEA, and the other is a present-day 
psychological capacity.  Joyce wants to claim that the present-day psychological 
capacity is the very same proximate mechanism that was selected for in the EEA, but 
he has no means of establishing their identity.  Because human beings are no longer in 
the EEA, one cannot simply state of some psychological trait that it was selected for 
doing what it now does.  Because psychological traits do not leave traces in the fossil 
record, one cannot use paleontological evidence to establish structural continuity 
between ancestral minds and modern minds.  And because the moral sense is, by 
definition, unique to humans one cannot use comparative methods to establish that it is 
highly conserved (unlike the neurological reward systems for sex and eating that Joyce 
offered in response to Lahtiʼs criticism).  Putting the point somewhat differently, Joyce 
needs to motivate the claim that the moral sense is identical to whatever proximate 
mechanism emerged in response to the pressures that he supposes to have been 
operative in the EEA.  Using the terminology developed in Chapter Two, Joyce does not 
establish that the moral sense is a strong vertical homolog of some proximate 
mechanism that was selected for stabilizing prosocial attitudes in the EEA.  He has 
therefore offered an allegedly ultimate explanation of the moral sense rather than a real 
ultimate explanation of it.   
5.   The inference to moral skepticism 
At the beginning of Joyceʼs (2008) précis of The Evolution of Morality he characterizes 
his project as attempting to accomplish two tasks. 
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The first is to clarify and provisionally advocate the thesis that human morality is 
a distinct adaptation wrought by biological natural selection.  The second is to 
inquire whether this empirical thesis would, if true, have any metaethical 
implications (213). 
In the preceding sections of this chapter I have demonstrated that the arguments that he 
uses to accomplish the first task are multiply flawed.  I have shown that he has not 
supplied good reasons for accepting, even provisionally, his evolutionary hypothesis.  
Given the structure of the argument, this is sufficient to undermine its metaethical 
conclusion.  However, argumentative flaws are not always fatal.  Suppose that the 
criticisms that I have leveled against the empirical components of the argument can be 
met.  What then?  In the remainder of this chapter I wish to argue that there are further 
difficulties with the argument.  These difficulties go beyond worries about its empirical 
components. I will argue that even if one ignores the weaknesses of the empirical phase 
of the argument, and treats the empirical premises as sound, the skeptical metaethical 
conclusion does not follow from them. 
Joyceʼs inference to moral skepticism proceeds as follows.  Suppose that the moral 
sense can be given an exhaustively evolutionary adaptationist explanation.  To explain 
some biological feature as an adaptation is to make the case that the feature is such 
that it made the organisms that possessed it more fit, as measured in reproductive 
success, than those that did not possess it.  So, the claim that the moral sense was an 
adaptation is the claim that those ancestral humans that had the moral sense were 
more fit and had greater reproductive success than those that lacked it.  Because, 
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according to Joyce, the moral sense is genetically fixed, the descendants of early 
humans also possess it.  Hence, the moral sense came to be all but universal in our 
species.  In order to explain how this occurred, one needs to explain how the fitness-
enhancing effects of the moral sense were mediated.  That is, one needs to explain 
what it was about having the capacity for forming moral beliefs that resulted in those 
organisms have greater reproductive success than members of the population that 
lacked that capacity.  There was something about that capacity that gave them a 
reproductive edge.  There are two broad possibilities.  One is that, for any selected-for 
belief-forming capacity, one might explain the effect on fitness by citing the truth of the 
beliefs so formed.  Suppose that there is a cognitive faculty that was selected for 
forming beliefs about biological species.36  It seems reasonable that any fitness benefits 
that might have been accrued from such a faculty can be accounted for by its producing 
true beliefs about the plants and animals in the EEA.  This is because prehistoric 
hominins would have been unable to survive if they could not form such true beliefs.  
However, if Joyceʼs story is accurate, then the fitness benefits that were bestowed on 
early humans in virtue of their possession of a moral sense had nothing to do with the 
truth of moral beliefs.  These benefits can be exhaustively explained by the stabilizing 
effect of the moral sense on prosocial behavior.  So, there is no reason to think that any 
moral beliefs are true.  As Joyce puts the point: 
                                            
36 Some ethnobiologists hold that this is the case (Medin & Atran 1999). 
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We have an empirically confirmed theory about where our moral judgments come 
from (we are supposing).  This theory [i] doesn't state or imply that they are true, 
[ii] it doesn't have a background assumption that they are true, and, importantly, 
[iii] their truth is not surreptitiously buried in the theory by virtue of any form of 
moral naturalism.  This amounts to the discovery that our moral beliefs are the 
product of a process that is entirely independent of their truth, which forces the 
recognition that we have no grounds one way or the other for maintaining those 
beliefs. (211) 
Of course, certain moral beliefs intuitively strike one as being true.  But on Joyceʼs view 
this is because evolution has deceptively fashioned the human mind to misrepresent 
morally evaluative assessments as objective facts.  Once one understands the 
circumstances in which the moral sense emerged, and the function that it served in 
those circumstances, it becomes possible to expose the belief in moral facts as an 
illusion that was foisted upon us by evolution. 
Before going on to explain what is wrong with this argument, it is necessary to pause to 
consider Joyceʼs point (iii).  He introduces this proviso because if moral properties can 
be brought into line with natural properties (by virtue of being identical to them, 
constituting them, being realized by them, or some other relation) then it might be 
possible that there are facts that answer to moral judgments.  Suppose that the case 
can be made that moral goodness is realized by cooperativeness, kindness, reciprocity, 
and so on.  These are all characteristics that are, according to the debunking argument, 
stabilized by the moral sense.  Consequently, the moral sense stabilizes behaviors and 
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attitudes that are good.  In order for his argument to terminate in moral skepticism Joyce 
must close the door to this possibility.  He does this by offering a version of Mackieʼs 
(1977) Argument from Queerness.  Moral demands, he claims, are binding and non-
negotiable.  They seem to demand conformity to the exclusion of anything else (for 
example, hedonic or prudential considerations).  Moral naturalists must, Joyce believes, 
show how natural properties can have practical clout.  Roughly, whatever natural 
properties goodness consists in must be such that they are intrinsically prescriptive.  
Anyone acquainted with a moral fact would thereby be obligated to act in accordance 
with that fact.  There are no such facts, so moral naturalism is false.  
There are several responses that the realist can make to this sort of argument.  Two of 
these situate practical clout in the minds of the people making judgments, rather than in 
the things being judged.  One response is to say that it is the fact that one believes an 
item to be good that supplies the judgment with practical clout.  Another response is to 
argue that moral beliefs are causally inert and that moral desires supply practical clout.  
On these views, moral judgments are inescapable and authoritative for much the same 
reason that other beliefs or desires have practical clout (Brink 1984).  A third option is to 
reject Joyceʼs presumption that moral realism must come wrapped up in an objectivist 
package.  Objectivists hold that moral facts must be mind-independent – oneʼs attitude 
must play no part in making it the case that something is morally good or bad.  
Subjectivism rejects this presumption and has it that moral claims are true or false in 
virtue of facts about the mind of the person doing the judging.  Joyce does not address 
the subjectivist challenge (see Kahane 2011).   
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In attempting to undermine moral naturalism Joyce is faced with a dilemma.  He can 
either show that moral naturalism is false, or he cannot.  If he can show that it is false 
(as he thinks he has), then the debunking argument is not needed, and the evolutionary 
speculations are superfluous.  And if he cannot show that moral naturalism is false (as 
its defended believe), then the debunking argument cannot go through.  So, either the 
debunking argument is unnecessary or it cannot go through.  What is revealed here is 
that Joyceʼs evolutionary speculations play no real role in his inference to moral 
skepticism.  Non-empirical, conceptual considerations are doing all of the philosophical 
work. 
6.  An antidote to the Napoleon pill  
Having raised a major skeptical doubt about the professed role of claims about the 
evolutionary etiology of moral judgments in Joyceʼs theory, I will set it aside.  My final 
task in this chapter is to show that Joyceʼs skeptical conclusion is not justified even if 
one accepts all of his prior claims. 
Joyceʼs fictional example of a Napoleon pill is a useful point of entry for my argument.37  
Suppose that there is a pill which, if swallowed, causes one to have beliefs involving the 
concept Napoleon (call these “Napoleon beliefs”).  The pill also causes one to have 
amnesia about having taken it.  Further, suppose that people who do not take the pill 
                                            
37 There are actually two Napoleon pill examples in The Evolution of Morality.  I am 
using the second one, which conforms more precisely to the structure of the debunking 
argument. 
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never have Napoleon beliefs because the pill is necessary for having Napoleon beliefs.  
You discover that you have taken the pill.  Joyce argues, plausibly enough, that learning 
that you have taken the pill ought to undermine all of your Napoleon beliefs, because 
you come to understand that your Napoleon beliefs were caused by a truth-insensitive 
process.  You should, he thinks, take an antidote to rid yourself of the epistemically 
suspect beliefs.  Having done this, if you are interested in the warrant for Napoleon 
beliefs, you should seek out reliable sources of evidence about the existence or non-
existence of Napoleon.38   Joyce argues, analogously, that if there is a truth-insensitive 
evolutionary process that causes one to have moral beliefs this removes any warrant 
that one might have for believing that there are moral facts.  “If the analogy is 
reasonable,” he adds, “…it would appear that once we become aware of this genealogy 
of morals we should (epistemically) do something analogous to taking the antidote pill: 
cultivate agnosticism concerning all positive beliefs involving these concepts until we 
find some positive evidence for or against them” (2006: 181). 
To pinpoint what is wrong with this argument, consider that taking the pill is necessary 
for forming Napoleon beliefs.  The evolutionary analog of this would be to claim that 
were it not for the evolution of the moral sense nobody would have moral beliefs (beliefs 
featuring moral concepts).  But this is clearly wrong, as is evidenced by the fact that 
Joyce has written a whole book setting out his views about moral concepts using his 
                                            
38 Notice that this flies in the face of the previous claim that the pill is necessary for 
forming Napoleon beliefs because it is necessary for having the concept Napoleon. 
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rational, conscious, domain-general intelligence rather than a domain-specific module 
for making moral judgments.  So, the Napoleon pill story is importantly disanalogous to 
the evolutionary case.  The evolutionary story does not require that moral concepts 
must emanate from the moral sense, or even that the moral sense is necessary for 
making judgments that involve moral concepts.  The evolutionary hypothesis requires 
only that the moral sense evolved for making moral judgments.  Importantly, it does not 
show that moral judgments cannot also be made by other cognitive systems, including 
the domain-general one.  This implies that if moral facts exist, they might be known by 
means of rational reflection or some other reliable domain-general cognitive process.  
Suppose that this is the case.  Presumably, if domain-general intelligence was selected 
for, it was because of the fitness benefits that rationality provided to our ancestors.  
These benefits would be best accounted for by the truth-tracking power of rationality.  It 
follows that if rational deliberation can yield moral judgments these judgments are not 
vulnerable to the evolutionary debunking strategy.  There are two responses available to 
the evolutionary debunker, both of which are unsatisfactory.  The first is to insist that 
although moral judgments can be made on the basis of rational deliberation, all such 
judgments are erroneous because there are no moral facts.  The problem with this 
response is that it begs the question of moral properties in favor of the moral skeptic.  If 
moral realism is demonstrably unwarranted, and this can be shown on non-evolutionary 
grounds, then it is not clear why one would introduce an evolutionary argument for 
establishing that establishing that moral realism is unwarranted.  The other option is to 
refashion the evolutionary story to bring it in line with the Napoleon pill analogy.  One 
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might do this by stipulating that the moral sense is the only source of moral judgments.  
This option is problematic in several ways.  First, it flies in the face of empirical research 
indicating that people reach moral conclusions by the exercise of conscious reflection as 
well as through automatic, unconscious processing (e.g., Cushman et al. 2006, Pizarro 
& Bloom 2003, Paxton & Greene 2010).39  Second, it contradicts introspective 
awareness of rational moral deliberation.  And third, it is not warranted by the 
evolutionary theory that Joyce endorses.  The fact that some feature of an organism 
was selected for performing a certain function does not exclude the possibility that that 
function can be performed by a different feature of the organism that was not selected 
for performing it. 
7.  Conclusion 
Richard Joyceʼs debunking argument is an ambitious attempt to use evolutionary 
psychology to undermine moral realism.  If I am right, and I think that I am, he has failed 
to achieve his ambition.  Joyce failed, in part, because of his use of evolutionary 
psychology to frame his argument.  In doing this, he imported methodological errors that 
are endemic to that discipline (e.g. Dupré 2001, Buller 2005).  He does not seem to 
appreciate that one cannot simply “read off” proximate mechanisms from selection 
pressures.  That ancestral organisms were faced with certain adaptive challenges does 
not entail anything about which (if any) proximate mechanisms were selected for 
                                            
39 These are known as “dual process” models of moral cognition.
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responding to those challenges.  This oversight leads Joyce to move far too quickly from 
his speculative evolutionary scenario to the claim that the moral sense emerged in 
response to these pressures.  His failure to consider what other proximate mechanisms 
might have been at work makes his account a just-so story.  Looking more closely, it 
seems that Joyceʼs single-minded focus on the moral sense can be explained by his 
use of a top-down inferential strategy rather than an extrapolative one.  He begins with a 
psychological phenomenon found in contemporary humans and argues that certain 
selection pressures assumed to have been operative in the EEA likely accounted for its 
emergence.  Joyceʼs adaptationist stance may explain why his discussion of the 
empirical literature is so perfunctory, and why he neglects to consider evidence that 
favors anti-nativism.  Evolutionary stories that are constructed in this way do not show 
that contemporary psychological mechanisms are the very same mechanisms as those 
that emerged in the EEA.  In common with evolutionary psychologists, Joyce seems to 
be unaware of the problem.   
Joyceʼs third misappropriation of evolutionary theory concerns his unarticulated (and 
obviously unjustified) assumption that if a proximate mechanism is selected for 
performing function, then no other proximate mechanism can perform function.  Without 
this assumption, he cannot argue that the etiology of the moral sense excludes the 
possibility that moral beliefs track moral truths, and the debunking strategy cannot go 
through. 
That the failure of Joyceʼs argument can be laid at the doorstep of evolutionary 
psychology suggests that any philosophical enterprise that uncritically draws on this 
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discipline may be hampered by its methodological shortcomings.  But if the problem lies 
in how evolutionary psychology is presently done, might it not be possible to purge it of 
its errors and to use the purified version for philosophical purposes?  In my view, the 
prospects for this are dim, because evolutionary psychology of any sort invites one to do 
the impossible.  By its very nature it requires one to make claims about selection 
pressures that cannot be substantiated, to make unfalsifiable claims about the 
proximate mechanisms that were selected for responding to those pressures, and to 
make unjustified assumptions about the relations that obtain between features of our 
contemporary psychology and features of the psychology of prehistoric hominins.  
Evolutionary psychology is speculative through and through, and it is therefore 
important that philosophers who wish to incorporate evolutionary biology into their 
research program resist its seductive appeal. 
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